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ABSTRACT
Nianogo, Thierry Wendpouire. PhD. The University of Memphis. May /2013. ES-
SAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTHCARE ECONOMICS. Major Profes-
sors: Dr. William T. Smith and Dr. Albert A. Okunade.
My dissertation comprises three essays in theoretical economics and applied mi-
croeconomics. They touch on societal, health and environmental issues from an eco-
nomic perspective, with the goal of promoting sustainable development and equity. The
first essay probes the sources of regional disparities in population health outcomes. I
identify the drivers of alternative measures of health outcomes, using data from two
specific US regions (the South, which has relatively lower health status; and the North-
east, which enjoys relatively higher health status). Then, using the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition, I analyze these differences in health outcomes and explore their policy
implications. The second essay, exclusively theoretical, models the behavioral reactions
of economic agents to climatic change in a stochastic framework. Their reaction toward
increasing uncertainties about the damages caused by their pollution levels, as well as
the corresponding Pareto equilibrium and its policy implications are computed and dis-
cussed. Lastly, the third essay investigates the drivers of prescription drug consumption
separately in selected states with low, average, and high prescription drug consump-
tion US states. The noticeable geographic variations in core drivers of health care costs
motivate the need to consider separate econometric models. Also to control for the non-
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My research interest emanates from observations that the greatest challenges of
most economies is not the lack of riches, but more so the misappropriation & mis-
allocation of their economic, natural, & human resources. Broadly stated, it put empha-
sis on the notions of sustainable development on a local, as well as on a more global
level. My dissertation comprises four essays, which explore four main subfields of eco-
nomics: (1) Environmental issues, (2) health economics, (3) development economics,
and (4) the trade-offs between equity and efficiency.
In the first essay, using 2010-2012 county level data, I investigate regional health
disparities in the US northeastern and southern states. The goal of US Healthy Peo-
ple 2010 is to raise population health status and to reduce disparities. One important
source of health disparities is geographic location, which will be the focus of this essay.
Past studies investigated how different factors affect US health outcomes. However,
health policies from studies not accounting for intrinsic regional differences may mis-
lead. Therefore, this county level investigation focuses on the two distinct US north-
eastern and southern states. Specifically, population health status in southern states is
relatively poor in contrast with the healthier northeastern states. This implies the ex-
istence of regional variations in the influence of the determinants of population health
status. First, a regional comparison of the determinants of important health outcome
measures is undertaken. Obesity and access to care are consistently the most influen-
tial determinants of each outcome measure across the regions. Next, using a 3-fold
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the regional differences in health outcomes are parti-
tioned into portion explained by each region health factor endowments and the portion
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unexplained (discrimination). Half of the differences in clinically-assessed outcome
measures (premature death and low birth weight rates) are unexplained by health en-
dowments. The explained portion for the self-assessed outcomes (average number of
physically and mentally unhealthy days per month) is small. Study findings justify the
need to account for regional variations in constructing economic models of health out-
comes to strengthen implications for policy.
The second essay studies the linkage between uncertainties about climate change
and global emissions of greenhouse gases, in a theoretical framework. Until recently,
uncertainty has mostly been perceived as a “bad”. However, Bramoullé and Treich
(2009) demonstrate that welfare may increase under uncertainty. They illustrate this
possibility with the compelling example of global warming. Greenhouse emissions
are affected by two distinct forces. On the one hand, there is a strategic interaction:
each country has an incentive to “free-ride” by allowing the other countries to carry the
burden of cutting emissions. On the other hand, there is a non-strategic reaction, exclu-
sively due to the uncertainty: a prudent [in the sense of Kimball (1993)] country may
reduce its emissions when faced with uncertainty about the impact of global warming.
The overall impact on welfare depends on whether the strategic effect offsets the effect
of uncertainty. In my proposed theoretical essay, I follow B&T in using an n-country
Nash equilibrium game in emissions. Using a less restrictive model, I conclude it is not
necessarily true that the uncertainty will lower emissions. The impact of uncertainty on
a country’s decision to reduce (increase) emissions depends on its ordinal preferences
(Are the emissions strategic substitutes or strategic complements), as well as on its be-
havioral response to risk (Is the country prudent proper, cross-prudent). This has two
main policy implications. First, at a macroeconomic level, policies of environmental
organizations that work to alleviate the risk countries may face, through risk sharing,
may not be effective in inducing them to reduce their emissions. Second, it is important
to implement different policies across countries, accounting for each country’s particu-
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lar preferences.
In my third essay, I investigate the drivers of prescription drug consumption sepa-
rately in selected low (ID, SD, and WA), medium (AR, ND) and high (TN) prescription
drug consumption US states. Prescription drugs expenditure, currently accounting for
10% of total US healthcare spending, is the third largest and a rapidly growing com-
ponent of healthcare costs. The 2006 Medicare Part D drug benefits and the 2010 Af-
fordable Care Act are catalysts for further increases in drug spending due to greater
insurance coverage. Consequently, this research investigating the drivers of prescrip-
tion drug consumption is important and timely for its cost containment policy impli-
cations. Significant geographic variations in population health status, access to care,
socio-economics and demographics, which are core drivers of health care costs; and the
cross-state disparities convergence in pharmaceutical expenditures motivate the need
to construct and estimate separate econometric models. Since healthcare data tend to
be skewed, we fitted the variance stabilizing Box-Cox power family of transformations
model to 2010 county-level observations to investigate the drivers of prescription drug
consumption separately in low and high drug consumption regions. This innovative
study is the first to separately model drug consumption, using the most recent county
level data, in these disparate regions. Our study reveals several interesting findings.
First, the optimal model λ -power transformation parameter estimates for the depen-
dent variable in high (λ=0.568) Average (λ=0.696), and high (λ=0) spending regions
differ significantly. Second, the income elasticity estimates also differ in high (0.536)
and low (0.481) spending regions. Third, contrasting the many earlier studies model-
ing drug expenditures (rather than number of filled prescriptions used in our study) we
detect prescription drugs to be a normal good and a technical necessity (the income
elasticity for the pooled data model is 0.461) which generally accords with a priori the-
ory. Fourth, while the numerical estimates of the extent to which similar factors drive
prescription drug consumption differs across regions, access to primary care physicians
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in the high consumption region is highly statistically significant. Policy implications
are explored.
In summary, my goal is to interactively investigate economic issues both theoret-
ically and empirically using solid statistical foundations and to make relevant policy
inferences by reconciling the theory to the empirics.
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CHAPTER 2
COMPARING AND DECOMPOSING THE DETERMINANTS OF
MULTIPLE HEALTH OUTCOMES IN SOUTHERN AND
NORTHEASTERN US STATES USING COUNTY DATA
2.1 Introduction
To improve population health outcomes, governments allocate substantial funds to-
ward the health sector. However, the steady growth of the US health expenditures (in-
cluding hospital care, physician & clinical services, prescription drugs spendings) as a
percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (from 13.2% in 2000 to 17.4% in 20091 ) has
not significantly raised population health. Among OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) countries, in United States life expectancy rankings
have declined from 14 in 1980 to 25 in 2008 (OECD Health Division, 2011). More-
over, a recent study links about 62% of the bankruptcies filed in 2007 to medical ex-
penses (Himmelstein et al. 2009). Altogether, these observations suggesting that the
US healthcare system may be “broken also call for a better understanding of the system
in order to advocate effective reforms capable of addressing cost inefficiencies and dis-
tributional imbalances.
The unhealthy behaviors (smoking and unhealthy habits) of the population, inad-
equate access to healthcare, and healthcare system deficiencies are among the most
prominent reasons why relatively low health outcomes still prevail in the US despites
high spending in the healthcare sector. More recently, scholars have linked low health
status to health disparities (unfavorable societal conditions). For example, Adler and
Rehkopf (2008) find that the US health status is worse for the poor and health dispar-
ities vary across outcome measures, time and geographic location (Diez-Roux et al.,
1. http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/oecdhealthdata2012.htm
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2001). Similarly, Isaacs and Schroeder (2004) call for health policies to address all dis-
parities, in addition to improving population health status through public policies that
change behaviors and expand insurance coverage to the uninsured and under-insured.
According to the Advisory Committee for Healthy People 2020 (Healthy People
2020), “Health disparities are systematic, plausibly avoidable health differences ad-
versely affecting socially disadvantaged groups”. The US Healthy People initiative
aims at eliminating these disparities including in geographic location. The present
study, focusing on regional health disparities, considers one mortality health outcome
measure (premature death) and three morbidity measures (average number of mentally
ill-days, number of physically ill-days, and the low birth weight) in two distinct US re-
gions. Our focus regions are southern and northeastern states. The interest in the south-
ern states is justified by the inherently poor population health. Baird (2010) claims that
several southern states (Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, West
Virginia, and Kentucky) have high obesity prevalence (over 30% of the population) and
also documents the hypertension and diabetes rates to be among the highest in the US.
Interestingly, these states also lag in educational achievements and access to healthcare
with higher poverty rates than the rest of the nation. However, in contrast, residents
of most northeastern states tend to healthier, more educated and wealthier. Thus, there
would be significant regional differences in their health outcomes. The interesting ques-
tion then will be finding the extent to which these differences could be explained by each
region’s health factor endowments (e.g., behavioral factors, socioeconomic status, envi-
ronmental factors, access to care, quality of care, build environment, and demographic
variable) or by unmeasured factors that we attribute to regional discrimination.
This study is important for several contributions. First, it identifies the relevant
drivers of the different health outcomes in the two distinct US regions (northeastern and
southern states) using county level observations. Second, it decomposes differences in
the regional health outcomes into the portion explained by health endowments and the
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portion unexplained. Third, our findings motivate development of policies targeting in-
tervention strategies to each region for reducing regional health disparities.
This research proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews pertinent literature on the de-
terminant of different health outcomes measures. Section 3 presents the data, defines
the variables in the health outcome models, and discusses the research methodology.
Section 4 discusses empirical regression estimation results. Section 5 presents results
of the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Section 5 explores policy implications of find-
ings and concludes.
2.2 Previous Literature
Health outcomes: Analysis in this work is based on four health outcomes mea-
sures: one mortality (potential life-years loss before age 75, YPLL75) and three mor-
bidity (low birth weight rates, number of physically and mentally unhealthy days per
month for adults) measures. Of these, only the mean unhealthy days measures are
self-accessed. Premature death rates capture deaths that could have been avoided had
the healthcare system been more efficient. Raw mortality rates in developed countries
are mainly driven by a relatively high death rate of the older population (Or, 2000),
therefore policies derived from studying these mortality measures could be misleading.
The premature death rates can be calculated as follows. First, standard a cut-off age
(e.g., 75) is considered assuming that if an individual was able to fully benefit from
the healthcare system, she would be expected to reach at least the cut-off age. Second,
the number Life-Years Loss (LYL) are obtained by subtracting the age of death i from
the cut-off age for specific age groups. Last, the premature death rate is reported per
100,000 by summing the LYL of each age group, weighted by its proportion in the en-
tire population.
Analytically, the premature death rate (YPLL75) can be obtained from the following









αi is the weight of a specific age group in the total population, and di the total number
of death at age i.
Low birth weight rate2 is a good indicator of current health status, as well as fu-
ture health outcome. Individuals weighing less than 2500g at birth are more likely
to develop chronic diseases growing up. For example, low birth weight is linked to
high blood pressure (Irving et al., 2004), obesity in later years (LA BioMed, 2011) and
asthma (Brooks, 2001) in adolescent and adults.
The other morbidity measures (the mean physically and mentally unhealthy days
per month for adults) capture health-related quality of life. Despite their fairly exten-
sive use in the literature, few studies have concluded that for the better educated and
women, health problems tend to have a stronger effect on these self-reported measures
(Delpierre et al., 2009, Salomon et al., 2009). One implication is the tendency to over-
estimate health disparities in these population groups.
Health behavioral factors: These are well-documented contributing factors to ad-
verse health outcomes. The specific factors of interests are the obesity rates, smoking
rates, drinking and exercising habits, as well as the teen-birth rates. An individual
whose BMI (Body Mass Index) exceeds 30 is said to be obese. Obesity is known to
lessen life expectancy for all races and age groups. Fontaine and et al. (2003) estimate
that morbid obesity (BMI > 45) could lead to 13 and 8 years of life loss, respectively,
for 20 years old white men and white women. Similarly, they find 11 and 5 years life
2. a Birth weight of less than 5.5 lbs or 2,500 grams
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loss for black men and women, respectively. Obesity also exposes individuals to mul-
tiple health risks, such as Type-2 diabetes (McCarthy, 2010), heart disease (Alexander,
2001), cancer (Wolin et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2011), and other complications. The lack
of exercise, excessive drinking, and smoking also exacerbate all these conditions. Inde-
pendently of socio-economic backgrounds, teen pregnancies are more likely to lead to
adverse health outcomes both for the mother and the infant. Inadequate prenatal cares,
risky behavior during these pregnancies usually lead to pre-term delivery and low birth
weight (Chen et al., 2007).
Access to care factors: It is well documented that greater access to the healthcare
system and to health providers leads to better health. The main access to care variables
is the population percent younger than 65 years without insurance, and the primary care
and mental health provider rates. The US Census Bureau, in 2010, estimated that 49.9
million Americans were uninsured and 55.3% of the insured were covered by work-
related health insurance (Carmen et al., 2011). Absent other options, uninsured popu-
lation usually lacks recommended care when facing chronic diseases and consequently
will have a lower life span (Andrulis, 1998).
The higher the provider rate in a specific region, the greater is the health care access
and expected health outcome.
Quality of care factors: Two measures of the health care quality considered in
this study. First is the hospitalization rate for Ambulatory Care Sensitive Conditions
(ACSC) capturing preventable hospitalization rates, and second is the percent of dia-
betic Medicare enrollees who received HbA1c screening, indicating the degree of pre-
ventive care in a given population. A high ACSC rate is correlated with the lack of
proper primary care and in turn could cause premature deaths (McCall et al., 2001).
9
Socio-economic and environmental factors: Since more than half the US popu-
lation has employer-based health insurance there is a significant linkage to education
(Winkleby et al., 1992), income (Lochner et al., 2001) poverty and unemployment rate.
“People with higher incomes or personal wealth, more years of education, and who live
in a healthy and safe environment have, on average, longer life expectancies and better
overall health outcomes3 ..
Environmental factors pertain to air quality, availability of healthy food outlets, and
liquor store density.
2.3 Data and Methodology
Data
This study employs a 3-year (2010, 2011, and 2012) panel dataset from the County
Level Raking (CLR). The rankings are the result of a collaboration of The Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation and The University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute. The
CLR compiles health outcomes and health factors, at the county level, for all the US
states. Specifically, information is provided on various morbidity and mortality health
outcomes measures, and health factors sub-grouped into health behavior, clinical care,
socio-economic, environmental, and demographic factors (See, Appendix A).
Some variables are omitted from our regression analysis because they are not con-
sistently reported. As earlier indicated, the two US regions of particular interest to this
study are counties in the southern (Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Tennessee, N. Carolina,
S. Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida) and northeastern
(Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania) states. The research focus in contrast-
ing and comparing these regions emanates from observations that the southern states,




risky health behaviors, and have poor health outcomes.
Descriptive statistics of the data in Table 2.1, by region, for 2010 to 2012, confirm
on the one hand, in terms of health outcomes, that the premature death rate is about 33%
worse in the south. Also the percent of live births with low birth weight is 2 percentage
points higher (9.4 in the south and 7.4 in the northeast). Similarly, adults in the south
report more unhealthy days per months. As expected, the 30.7% obesity prevalence in
the south is significantly higher than the 26.4% in the northeast. Southern females are
50% more likely to give birth in their teen ages (15-19). The average teen-birth rate per
1000 in the south is 62.7 and 27.4 in the northeast. Access to care measures reveals that
the non-Medicare population without health insurance is almost 10 percentage points
higher in the south. Moreover, the primary care provider rate per 100,000 of the pop-
ulation is almost 34% greater in the northeast. Also, educational attainments (average
freshman graduation rate and the percent of population age 25+ with a 4-year college
degree or higher) and unemployment rates are significantly higher in the south. Finally,
demographic controls indicate presence of more minorities in the south but the female
population percent in both regions is identical.
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Table 2.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics, by Region
Focus Area Variables Northeast South
Health Outcome
Premature Death Rate 6,582.79 9,819.32
Physical Unhealthy Days per month 3.471 4.198
Mentally Unhealthy Days per month 3.451 3.747
Low Birth Weight Rate 7.409 9.389
Health Behavior
Obese 26.775 30.771














Pm days 2.289 1.898









The goal of this study is to identify the drivers of regional health disparities, to un-
derstand how they affect the different health outcomes, and to derive relevant policy in-
ferences. To propose relevant health program and policies capable of reducing adverse
health outcome effects, it is important to identify the relevant health factors affecting
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theses health outcomes the mechanisms through which these health factors affect re-
gional health status. Here, isolating the differences in these health outcomes into those
caused by the underlying health factors and those linked to unmeasured characteristics
(e.g., regional discrimination, cultural differences) is expected to more insightful4 .
The proposed regression model takes the semi-log functional form:







With Y the health outcome; X ji, the health factors,i the county considered, and j the
health factor group (heath behavior, clinical care, socio-economics, and environmental
factors).
Balsa et al. (2007) and Hebert et al. (2008) stress that treating any difference as dis-
parities, without controlling for the various factors that could lead to these differences
is a major shortcoming of the literature on health disparities. To avoid this common
pitfall, it is important to identify the relevant health factors for each health outcome and
use decomposition techniques to understand the health status differences across regions.
In this paper, we use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method 5 (described below) to
identify the portion of the regional differences in health outcomes due to unmeasured
variables (regional discrimination) and the portion related to the region’s own attributes.
Given the two regions (south and northeast), the various health outcome variables Y ,
and a set of predictors X , how much of the mean outcome differences, R, is accounted
for by the group differences in the predictors?
4. Diez-Roux et al., (2001), for example, find that poor neighborhoods have lower health status, inde-
pendently of race, income, or education.
5. See, Jann , 2008
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R = E[Log(YNE)]−E[Log(YS)] (2.3)
E(Yi) denotes the expected value of the outcome variable.
The mean outcome difference can be expressed as the difference in the linear pre-
diction at the group-specific means of the regressors. That is:
R = E(X ′NE)βNE −E(X ′S)βS (2.4)
To identify the contribution of group differences in their predictors to the overall
health outcomes difference, Equation 2.4 can be rearranged, as follows:
R = [E(XNE)−E(XS)]′βS︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
+E(X ′S)(βNE −βS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+[E(XNE)−E(XS)]′(βNE −βS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
(2.5)
This is a three-fold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. The first part E = [E(XNE)−E(XS)]′βS
represents the part of the differential that is due to group differences in the predictors (the “en-
dowments effect”). The second component, the “coefficient effect”, C = E(X ′S)(βNE−βS) mea-
sures the contribution of differences in the coefficients (including differences in the intercept).
The third and last term, I = E(XNE)−E(XS)]′(βNE −βS), is an interaction term accounting for
the fact that differences in endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously between the two
groups.
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The decomposition presented in Equation 2.5 is formulated from the viewpoint of the north-
eastern counties, implying that the group differences in the predictors are weighted by the co-
efficients of the southern counties to determine the endowments effect (E). In other words, E
measures the expected change in mean health outcome of northeastern counties, if the group
had southern counties predictor levels. Similarly, for the second component (C), the differences
in coefficients are weighted by the south’s predictor levels. The second component measures
the expected change in the northeastern counties mean health outcomes, if it had the same es-
timation coefficients as in the southern counties. The differential can analogously be expressed
from the viewpoint of the northeastern counties, yielding a reverse three-fold decomposition.
The results for each health outcome are next presented.
We also perform the two fold decomposition (proportion explained and proportion unex-
plained) assuming the existence of a nondiscriminatory coefficients vector, β ∗, used to deter-
mine each component. In the two-fold decomposition the R can be written as:
R = [E(XNE)−E(XS)]′β ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q
+E(X ′NE)[βNE −β ∗]+E(X ′S)[β ∗−βS]︸ ︷︷ ︸
U
(2.6)
In the two-fold decomposition R = Q+U , Q = [E(XNE)−E(XS)]′β ∗ is the component
of the regional difference explained, and U = E(X ′NE)[βNE − β ∗] +E(X ′S)[β ∗− βS] is the un-
explained port on ascribed to discrimination. The two-fold decomposition results will defer
depending upon the β ∗ chosen. In our analysis we choseβ ∗ = βS. We also discuss findings of




Preliminary tests are necessary before decomposing the differences in the mean health out-
comes. For the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to be meaningful, it is essential that most of
health outcomes and other factors to be significantly different across the two regions. Table
2.2 summarizes the tests of the mean differences in health outcomes between the two regions.
Table 2.2, third column, presents the standard Student’s t-test of the difference in the means
between the two regions. The health outcomes and health factor variables are significantly dif-
ferent in the two regions if the p-value of the difference in means is less than 0.1% (α). The
results clearly show that all these variables are significantly different across the two regions, due
to the multiple testing procedures, the confidence intervals may be inflated and the probability
that the regional means differ will fall [the probability that at least of the 22 null hypothesis
test is rejected when true is 1− (1−α)22] . To reduce the False Discovery Rate (FDR), at a
level lower than that of the uncorrected Student’s t-test p-value, we use the Simes (1986) multi-
ple tests procedure to estimate the minimum rates that our discovery is false (q-value) for each
statistic. The q-values, in the last column of Table 2.2, close to zero confirm that the mean
health outcomes and health factors differ in the northeastern and the southern counties. We can
now proceed to estimate various regression models and investigate whether there is a proportion
of the mean health outcome difference between the two regions that is not explained by the
preferred model.
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Table 2.2: Student T-test and Simes Multiple Tests of the Differences in Means
Focus Area Variables Regional Differences Q-value (dof=2346)
Health Outcome
Premature Death −3236.5∗∗∗ 0
Physical Unhealthy Days −0.727∗∗∗ 3.21E-94
Mentally Unhealthy Days −0.295∗∗∗ 5.81E-13
















Pm days 0.391∗∗ 0.746765








Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Estimation results
Table 2.3 presents the regressions for decomposing the health outcomes. Across these, the
significant regional dummy suggests the need for region-specific estimates. There were no major
improvements when we considered state fixed effects models (See, Appendix B to Appendix E).
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Table 2.3: Health Outcomes Estimation Results
Y PPL75 PUD MUD LBW
NE South NE South NE South NE South
Constant 187.6∗∗∗ 98.60∗∗∗ 110.7∗∗∗ 74.04∗∗∗ 140.9∗∗∗ 57.84∗∗ 39.67∗ 9.238
(-10.28) (-7.23) (-4.82) (-4.05) (-5.63) (-2.69) (-2.36) (-0.95)
Obese 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0146∗∗∗ 0.00857∗∗∗ 0.00668∗∗∗
(-13.4) (-15.99) (-5.43) (-10.41) (-5.05) (-7.81) (-5.48) (-7.93)
Teenbirth 0.00216∗∗∗ 0.00177∗∗∗
(-4.14) (-10.43)
Uninsured -0.00804∗∗∗ -0.00449∗∗∗ -0.00452∗∗ -0.00622∗∗∗ -0.00899∗∗∗ -0.00428∗∗ -0.00345∗ -0.00372∗∗∗
(-6.25) (-5.27) (-2.65) (-4.92) (-3.67) (-2.63) (-2.39) (-6.23)
PCP 0.0000506 0.0000845 -0.000317∗∗∗ -0.000554∗∗∗ -0.000459∗∗∗ -0.000638∗∗∗ -0.000244∗∗∗ 0.000141∗
(-0.41) (-1.04) (-3.36) (-5.72) (-3.81) (-4.71) (-3.82) (-2.29)
MHP -0.0000964∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.0000616∗ 0.0000459
(-9.40) (-4.89) (-2.10) (-0.13)
ACSC 0.00204∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.00229∗∗∗ 0.000723∗∗∗
(-7.04) (-11.05) (-4.41) (-3.98)
HBA1C -0.00331∗∗∗ -0.00328∗∗∗
(-2.59) (-7.12)
AFGR -0.00190∗∗ -0.00177∗∗∗ -0.00272∗∗∗ -0.00124∗∗ -0.00210∗ -0.00245∗∗∗ 0.00013 -0.000946∗∗∗
(-2.98) (-5.09) (-3.60) (-2.73) (-2.25) (-4.48) (-0.22) (-3.85)
Unemployed 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00177 0.000249 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.00082 0.00909*** 0.00517 0.0000645
(-3.85) (-1.38) (-0.05) (-6.1) (-0.13) (-4.17) (-1.44) (-0.06)
Singleparent 0.00421∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00537∗∗∗ 0.00145∗ 0.00622∗∗∗ 0.00116 0.000718 0.00128∗∗∗
(-5.61) (-7.01) (-4.82) (-2.38) (-5.42) (-1.6) (-1.11) (-4.16)
Pm-days 0.00140∗∗ 0.000838
(2.64) (1.25)
Ozone-days 0.00142 -0.00342∗∗∗ 0.00150 -0.00287∗∗∗ 0.00367∗∗ -0.000901
(1.50) (-5.10) (1.40) (-4.66) (2.64) (-1.32)
Less18 -0.00962∗∗∗ -0.00653∗∗∗
(-4.49) (-6.61)
Over65 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.00762∗∗∗ 0.00712∗∗ 0.00475∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.00445∗∗
(-12.23) (-8.35) (-2.74) (-3.72) (-3.94) (-3.01)
Female 0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0000765 0.0149∗ -0.0015 -0.00726 0.00314 0.00465 0.00845∗∗∗
(-3.54) (-0.04) (-2.56) (-0.69) (-0.93) (-1.16) (-0.91) (-7.55)
Rural 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.000214 0.000291 0.000476∗ -0.000151 -0.000671∗∗ -0.00138∗∗∗ 0.000565∗∗∗
(-6.55) (-1.53) (-0.95) (-2.42) (-0.40) (-2.75) (-5.94) (-5.54)
Hispanic 0.0000135 -0.000985∗∗∗ 0.00402∗∗∗ -0.000369 0.000457 -0.00216∗∗∗ 0.00207∗ 0.000703∗
(-0.01) (-3.46) (-4.24) (-0.93) (-0.36) (-3.85) (-2.41) (-3.06)
Black 0.00741∗∗∗ 0.000686∗∗ -0.00408∗∗∗ -0.00402∗∗∗ -0.00168 -0.00448∗∗∗ 0.00695∗∗∗ 0.00647∗∗∗
(-8.44) (-2.82) (-5.34) (-11.16) (-1.59) (-10.12) (-11.12) (-33.92)
Year -0.0897∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0550∗∗∗ -0.0363∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗ -0.0283∗∗ -0.0189∗ -0.00381
(-9.89) (-6.58) (-4.82) (-3.99) (-5.58) (-2.64) (-2.27) (-0.79)
N 706 3085 696 2847 696 2864 698 3090
R2 0.738 0.503 0.337 0.219 0.232 0.103 0.589 0.65
Ad j−R2 0.732 0.5 0.322 0.215 0.216 0.099 0.581 0.648
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
YPLL75: Premature death rate before age 75; LBW: Low Birth Weight rates
PUD: Mean Physically Unhealthy days per month; MUD: Mean Mentally Unhealthy days per month
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Premature deaths
A one percent rise in obesity rates significantly increases premature death rates 2% in both
regions. That is a total increase 131 Life-Years Loss per 1,000 in the northeast and 196 in the
south. Moreover, obesity rates contribute most to the total Life-Years Loss in both regions. Sim-
ilarly, an increase in preventable hospitalization for Medicare enrollees (ACSC) increases the
number of Life-Years Loss. A percentage point rise in the number of avoidable hospitalizations
increases the total number of Life-Years Loss by 13.5 and 11 years respectively in the northeast
and in the south. Prevention (diabetes screening, HBA1C) significantly reduces the number of
Life-Years Loss, e.g., a 10 percent point increase in the number of diabetic Medicare enrollees
who receive HbA1c screening reduces premature death rates by 3% across the two regions.
Most socioeconomic factors have the expected effects and the coefficients are marginally
significant. The more educated a county’s population is the less the premature death rate. An
increase of the Average Freshman Graduation Rate (AFGR) by 1% reduces premature death
rates by approximately 0.2%. As expected, the unemployed are more likely to die prematurely;
in the northeast, a percentage rise in the unemployment rate leads to 1.3% rise in the number of
Life-Years Loss, but unemployment rate does not have a discernible effect in the south. Lastly,
family structure is important in population well-being: a percent rise in single-parent household
increases number of Life-Years Loss by 26 years in the northeast and 39 years in the south.
As expected, death in later years accounts for some Life-Years Loss in both regions, which
justifies the need to consider relative death rates in place of crude mortality rates. In the north-
east, a point increase of the female percentage significantly raises the number of life-years loss,
and a percentage point increase in the rural population increases the premature death rates by
0.14%. However, these variables do not have significant effect on premature death rates in the
south. A one percent rise in the black population in both regions increases premature death rates
by 0.7% in each region. Ethnic minorities have lower education, earn less and have lower health
status. Interestingly, we find the Hispanic population living longer in the south. Our estimation
results are in accordance with previous findings. For example, Schroeder (2007) concludes that
of the 5 major causes of premature deaths (genetics, socio-economic factors, habits, health care
factors, and environmental factor) access to health care play a significantly minor role compared
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to behavioral (e.g., obesity) and socio-economic factors.
Mean Physically and Mean Mentally Unhealthy Days per Month
As expected, being obese would significantly induce one to report more unhealthy days per
month. In the northeast region, a percent increase in obesity rate causes 1.1% increase in the
number of unhealthy days. The impact is much higher in the south; 1.67% increase in physically
unhealthy days and 1.46% increase in mentally unhealthy days.
All the socio-economic factors have the expected effects on the number of unhealthy days
and they are significant in most cases. The older the population, the more unhealthy days are
reported during any given month. Rural residents tend to report more, statistically insignifi-
cant, physically unhealthy days, and an increase in rural population rates significantly reduce
the number of reported mentally unhealthy days. This finding could be partly explained by
the rural-urban differences in work structure, lifestyle, and environment. Rural workers tend
to engage more in physically-demanding activities and may be less prone to urban area stress.
Caution that the estimation results explain only a small portion of the reported unhealthy days,
as these two measures are self-reported and may not fully capture the population health status.
Females tend to report more unhealthy days. Moriarty et al. (2003), on examining surveillance-
based health related quality of life data between 1993 and 2002, similarly found for all ethnic
groups, that women report on average one more physically and mentally unhealthy days than
men. Moreover, adults older than 75 also reported a greater number of physically unhealthy days
and married individuals reported, on average, less unhealthy days than never married persons
and unmarried couples. Also, adults with less high school education reported more physically
and mentally unhealthy days than those with high school education. In addition, adults who are
unable to work or unemployed reported more physically unhealthy days and more mentally un-
healthy days. Jia and Lubetkin (2005) concluded that all health related quality of life measures
decreased with greater obesity level.
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Low Birth Weight
Health behaviors contribute significantly to the rise in low birth weight rates. A one percent-
age point increase in the obesity rates increase low birth weight rates by 0.86 in the northeast
and by 0.67 in the south. Similarly, a percentage point increase in the teen birth rate leads, on
average, to 0.2% increase in low birth weight rates in both regions. While marginally small, an
increase in the average freshman graduation rate in the south appears to reduce low birth weight
rates. An increase in the number of single-parent households in the south increases low birth
weight rates. Not surprisingly Table 2.3 results suggest that socio-economic factors do not play
a significant role as a determinant of the low birth weight rate in the northeast.
The higher the percentage of individuals younger than 18 years, the lower the low birth
weight rate. Intuitively, this could be explained by more effective prenatal interventions in re-
cent years. The rural population percent reduces significantly low birth weight rates by 0.14%
in the northeast but increases it by 0.056% in the south. As expected, all of the ethnic minority
groups have relatively low birth weight outcomes. Moreover, and s expected, a rise in the per-
centage of uninsured adults in the population improves health outcomes as are improved access
to the various health care providers.
The standardized beta coefficients (Appendix F) suggest the obesity rates to be one of the
strongest predictors of health outcomes, across all measures in the two regions. Excess weight
is linked to many health problems, including Type-2 diabetes, cancers, coronary heart disease,
osteoarthritis, pregnancy complications, and premature mortality.
2.5 Health outcome decomposition
Using estimation results in Table 2.3, we decomposed the regional differences in mean
health outcomes. Our goal is to find out if the difference in health outcomes across the two re-
gions could be driven by some unmeasured factors. Two types of decompositions are presented:
a three-fold decomposition (endowment, coefficient and interaction effects) in Table 2.4 and a
two-fold decomposition (explained and unexplained components) in Table 3.56 .
6. In the two-fold decompositions, betas from the Southern States counties were considered.
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The first panel of Tables 2.4 and Table 2.5 reports each region’s health outcomes logarithmic
predictions, and the regional difference.
Table 2.4: Three-Fold Decompositions
YPLL75 MUD PUD LBW
Northeast 8.774∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.989∗∗∗
(1190.94) (191.04) (175.76) (357.54)
South 9.169∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗
(2323.45) (316.79) (251.90) (613.56)
Difference -0.395∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.0636∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(-47.22) (-22.69) (-7.36) (-34.65)
Endowment Effect -0.190∗∗∗ -0.0434∗∗∗ -0.0044 -0.141∗∗∗
(-11.50) (-3.78) (-0.19) (-18.28)
Coefficient Effect -0.163∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗ -0.0827∗∗∗
(-11.40) (-5.55) (-2.77) (-4.90)
Interaction Effect -0.0420∗ -0.0298 -7.8E-05 -0.00663
(-2.04) (-1.44) (-0.00) (-0.37)
N 3791 3543 3560 3788
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; t-Statistics in parentheses
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Table 2.5: Two-Fold Decompositions
YPLL75 MUD PUD LBW
Northeast 8.774∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 1.223∗∗∗ 1.989∗∗∗
(1194.43) (195.00) (178.72) (350.25)
South 9.169∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 2.219∗∗∗
(2295.10) (309.56) (256.37) (612.63)
Difference -0.395∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.0636∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(-47.20) (-22.83) (-7.49) (-34.13)
Explained Portion -0.232∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗ -0.00448 -0.147∗∗∗
(-13.60) (-4.72) (-0.23) (-9.22)
Unexplained Portion -0.163∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.0591∗∗ -0.0827∗∗∗
(-9.67) (-5.99) (-2.60) (-5.16)
N 3791 3543 3560 3788
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; t-Statistics in parentheses
Premature deaths
The premature death rate decompositions predict an average 6464 (= e8.774) Life-Years
Loss per 100,000 for the northeastern counties, and 9595 (= e9.169) in the southern counties.
The model predicts premature death rates to be 39.5% higher in the south.
The three-fold decomposition results in Table 2.4, first, indicate that about 48.1% of the
regional difference in the premature death rates is explained by each region’s endowments in
health factors. Intuitively, it implies that the number of Life-Years Loss in the northeast would
have been lower by 1506 years per 100,000, if the northeastern counties had the same health
characteristics as the southern counties. Second, the coefficient effect indicates that approxi-
mately 4.26% of that difference is explained by the regions’ coefficients, that is if the regression
coefficients from southern counties were applied to the northeastern counties, the number of
Life-Years Loss would have been lessen by 1292 years. Lastly, the interaction term which ac-
counts for the difference in coefficient and endowments occur simultaneously represent only
10.63% of the difference. The two-fold decomposition suggests that 58.73% (= 0.2320.395 ) of the
regional difference is explained by the model, while 49.26% (= 0.1630.395 ) remains unexplained.
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Mean unhealthy days per month
On average, the models predict for the northeastern counties that an adult reports 3.4 (=
e1.23) physically unhealthy days, and 3.4 (= e1.223) mentally unhealthy days per month. It also
predicts 4.09 (= e1.408) physically unhealthy days, and 33.62 (= e1.287) mentally unhealthy days
per month for the southern counties. The decomposition suggests that, in the south, the aver-
age physically unhealthy days are 17.8% higher and the mean mentally unhealthy days, 6.36%
higher than those in the northeast. These estimates, a-priori, may appear marginally small,
however if aggregated for the entire workforce and expressed monetarily, represents a substan-
tial loss in social welfare.
The three-fold decomposition, for both outcomes, indicates that most of the regional dif-
ference is caused by the coefficient effect: the average number on physically unhealthy days
per month in the northeast would be 58.42% lower if the southern counties coefficient estimates
were applied; and the average mentally unhealthy days per month 93% lower. Only 24.38% of
the difference in physically unhealthy days and 7% of the difference in mentally unhealthy days
between the two regions was explained by the regions health endowments.
The two-fold decompositions indicate that, respectively, 76.4% and 88.68% of the regional
differences in physically and mentally unhealthy days per month are not explained by the re-
gression models.
Low birth Weight
The low birth weight decompositions predict an average low birth weight rate of 7.31% for
the northeastern counties and 9.2% for the southern counties, yielding a regional difference of
1.89 percentage point, a 23% regional difference. The three-fold decomposition result suggests
61.30% of this difference to be explained by the regions’ endowments in health factors: if
the northeastern counties had identical health endowments to the southern counties, out of 100
live births, 6 more infants would weigh less than 2500g. The coefficient effect indicates that
about 35.95% of the difference is explained by the regions coefficients, meaning that if the
northeastern counties had the same coefficient as the southern counties, the premature deaths
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rates would have been of 12.5% instead of 7.31%. Finally, the interaction term which accounts
for the fact that the difference in coefficient and in endowments occur simultaneously represent
3% of the overall difference in low birth weight rate between the two regions.
The two fold decomposition indicates that 61.74% of the regional difference is explained by
the selected regressions.
Comparable results obtained when, instead of using betas from the south as reference in the
two-fold decompositions, regressors from a pooled model were used. (See, Appendix G).
2.6 Conclusion
This study investigates whether regional disparities could partially explain differences in the
population health outcomes, variously measured, in southern and northeastern US states.
Using a 3-year county level data in these states, we were able to separate the proportion of the
difference in health outcomes in these regions (northeast and the south) into that explained by
the regions’ health endowments and the proportion unexplained (e.g., regional health dispari-
ties). We considered four relevant health outcomes that include mortality measure (potential
number of Life-Years loss before age 75) and three morbidity measures (mean physically and
mean mentally unhealthy days per month; and low birth weight rate). Two of the health out-
comes measures are self-accessed (mean unhealthy days), thus we anticipated that the policy
inferences would differ from those of the more objective, clinically-accessed, measures (As in,
Chen et al., 2010).
The best fitted regression for each health outcome was used for conducting the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition. For all regressions, obesity rate and access to care determinants impact
strongly on each region’s health outcomes. Our results also suggest that an important proportion
of the difference in health outcomes between the two regions has yet to be explained when us-
ing the more objective health outcome measures. We find approximately half of the difference
in premature death rates and in low birth weight rates to be unexplained by the regions health
endowments.
Some policy implications arise from these findings. First, the relatively high proportion
of the regional difference in the clinically-accessed health outcomes not explained by regional
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health factors suggests the prevalence of regional discrimination in health outcomes. Second,
in order to raise US population health status, it is important to focus on region-specific preven-
tive care. Third, more effective public education and information strategies raising population
awareness to the health dangers of obesity are in order. Fourth, broad-based access to various
health services personnel should be provided to populations (Kennedy, 2005). Regarding insur-
ance coverage, the reforms inspired by countries with more effective healthcare systems could
reduce disparities in health outcomes among US regions. Finally, our research findings echo the
McGinnis et al., (2002) recommendation that future US health strategies and policies should tar-
get more of the “actionable determinants” of health (behavioral factor, access to care, income,
and education) in the region with atrophied health status. Additionally, more effective incentives
to attract healthcare providers to the currently under-served zones (e.g., through tax-credits and
student loan abatements) on a sustainable basis could raise access to care in low performing US
regions, e.g., the south.
Future studies might look further into the impact of regional disparities on health status, be-
yond the behavioral, access to care, socio economic and demographic factors. For example what
could be the impact of a region’s overall stress level on its population resistance to illnesses?
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CHAPTER 3
SUBSTITUTABILITY, COMPLEMENTARY, AND RISK WITH
STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS: AN APPLICATION TO GLOBAL
WARMING
3.1 Introduction
This paper addresses a policy issue that raises some interesting theoretical questions.The
policy issue is about how uncertainty about climate change affects global emissions of green-
house gases. The fourth assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC,
2007) concluded that the earth’s climate is changing, and that these changes can be attributed
to the increase in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration. However, the science of climate
change is so complex that there is inescapable uncertainty about both the sources and the con-
sequences of climate change. The IPCC report emphasized the importance of recognizing these
uncertainties, but they elicit widely divergent reactions. On the one hand, some(for example,
Seitz, 1994) contend that climate change is not a serious threat to humankind. On the other hand,
others (for example, Andronova, Schlesinger, & Yohe, 2004) argue that it would be prudent to
pursue policies that reduce greenhouse gases emissions, precisely because of the uncertainties
inherent in climate change science. Even if such policies are desirable, however, implementing
them may be problematic: each country may have even incentive to “free ride,” and let other
countries carry the burden of reducing emissions.
The theoretical challenge is to construct a model that incorporates both uncertainty about
climate change and strategic behavior, in order to investigate how an economic agent emission
level and welfare will be affected by greater climatic risks. When should the world as a whole
reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases? How do strategic interactions complicate the achieve-
ment of this goal? Is it possible that uncertainty can, by inducing a prudent reduction in emis-
sions, at least partially offset the sub-optimality caused by free-riding behavior? As Bramoullé
and Treich (2009) put it in the provocative title of their recent paper, “Can Uncertainty Allevi-
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ate the Commons Problem?” Their answer is a tentative yes: Uncertainty about environmental
quality may actually increase welfare, if the positive effect of reducing their emissions is higher
than the negative effect of uncertainty.
In this paper we generalize the model of Bramoullé and Treich (2009) [hereafter B&T] to
investigate these questions in a richer environment and to see how robust their conclusion re-
mains. They imagine a world comprised of n countries, where each country i derives utility
from the environmental quality q, and its emissions ei. Environmental quality depends upon
aggregate emissions of all of the countries, and is subject to a random shock. Their utility func-
tion is very special: U(ei,q) = u(ei + q), where u is increasing and concave, u′ > 0,u′′ < 0.
This amounts to assuming that the country is risk averse with respect to the linear aggregator
ei+q so that (in the absence of uncertainty) the country would view emissions and environmen-
tal quality as perfect substitutes. This, requires emissions and environmental to be Edgeworth
complements (since Ueq = u′′ < 0), which in turn forces countries’ emissions to be strategic
substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985).
In this paper we employ a general function U(ei,q). The only restriction we impose on
this function is concavity. This has two important consequences. First, it allows a much richer
characterization of risk preferences: Given concavity, the country is risk averse with respect to
both arguments(Uee,Uqq < 0). However, we allow emissions to be either Edgeworth substitutes
or complements. The country may thus be either correlation-averse (Ueq ≤ 0) or correlation-
loving (Ueq ≥ 0) (Eeckhoudt, Ray, & Schlesinger, 2007). Furthermore, the country may be
prudent (Ueee > 0) or imprudent (Uqqq < 0) (the terminology is adapted from Kimball,1990);
it may be cross-prudent environmental quality (Ueqq ≥ 0) or cross-imprudent (Ueqq ≤ 0) in en-
vironmental quality (see again Eeckhoudt, Ray, & Schlesinger, 2007). These risk preferences
interact in a complicated way to determine the direction of the country’s response to an increase
in environmental uncertainty. Allowing emissions and environmental quality to be Edgeworth
complements within countries, also permits these countries’ emissions to be strategic substi-
tutes. Second, whether emissions are strategic substitutes − as they are in extreme form in
B&T− or strategic complements will determine the magnitude of the response to risk. This is
because strategic complementarity induces well-known “multiplier” effects.
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Our model is a descendant of the seminal paper by Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky (1990) on
Nash equilibrium with uncertainty. Unlike them, however, we prove the existence of a unique
equilibrium rather than assume it. This in turn provides a condition that allows us to determine
the sign of the effect of uncertainty on emissions. Our purpose is also different from theirs.
They establish conditions under which the direction of the effect of uncertainty on the choice
variables is the same in the Nash equilibrium as for an individual decision maker. Our purpose
is to determine conditions under which uncertainty will reduce emissions and by how much
and hence, possibly, improve welfare.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes
the socially optimal emissions set by a social planner and establishes the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium in the strategic setting. Section 4 determines the conditions under which an in-
crease in uncertainty about environmental damages will reduce greenhouse emissions. Section
5 considers when uncertainty will actually improve welfare. Section 6 offers some concluding
thoughts.
3.2 Model
Our model is an extension of that of B&T. There are n ≥ 2 countries, of which each
countryi = 1, . . . ,n engages in emissions ei ≥ 0.
Technology
Each countryi = 1, . . . ,n engages in emissions ei ≥ 0. A country enjoys benefits from emit-
ting, but by doing so contributes the degradation of environmental quality. Following of B&T,
we assume that the benefit of emitting is simply equal to the rate of emissions itself (e.g, greater
emissions increase the prodruction level).
Environmental quality q depends upon the total emissions of all of the countries ∑ni=1 ei,







q̄ is the maximum environmental quality level attainable, a pristine environment. The func-
tion d(∑ni=1 ei) is the damage function. It is increasing and convex in total emissions, so
d′ > 0,d′′ ≥ 0. Furthermore, no environmental degradation occurs when there are no emis-
sions, so d(0) = 0. The damage caused by emissions is uncertain: damage in each country
is subject to a multiplicative shock θi, assumed to be non-negative. Since the shocks are as-
sumed to be identical ex ante, we will henceforth write θi = θ . This specification of technology
is identical to that of B&T except that we incorporate the endowment of environmental quality q̄.
Preferences
Each country i derives utility from both its emissions and the quality of the environment
according to the utility function U(ei,q). In contrast to B&T we impose no restrictions on this
utility function other than that it be increasing and concave in both arguments. We assume that
all countries share the same preferences.
Concavity requires risk aversion with respect to both emissions and environmental quality,
Uee < 0,Uqq < 0. However, the cross-partial partial Ueq will also play an important role in our
analysis. Marginal utility is super-modular if Ueq > 0 and sub-modular if Ueq < 01 . Sub- or
super-modularity affects behavior in two distinct ways.On the one hand, in a world without un-
certainty the sign of Ueq governs whether emissions and environmental quality are Edgeworth
complements (Ueq > 0 ) or substitutes (Ueq < 0). Since an increase in emissions by another
country reduces environmental quality, Edgeworth complementarity is a sufficient condition for
emissions in different countries to be strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer,
1985) −in other words, the reaction functions will be negatively sloped and the game will be
sub-modular [Amir, (2005)]. If, however, emissions and environmental quality are sufficiently
strong Edgeworth substitutes then it is possible for emissions in different countries to be strate-
gic complements, so the game will be super-modular.
1. See the excellent survey on super-modularity by Amir (2005).
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It is important in this regard to notice how restrictive the utility function used by Bramoullé
and Treich (2009) is. If U(ei,q) = u(ei + q), as they assume, then because of diminishing
marginal utility emissions and environmental quality must be Edgeworth complements, Ueq =
u′′ < 0. This precludes the possibility of strategic complementarity. Their utility function is a
concave transformation of the linear aggregator ei +q, so they in effect assuming ordinal pref-
erences between emissions and environmental quality are perfect substitutes.
On the other hand, in a world of uncertainty the sign of Ueq also governs whether the pref-
erences are correlation-averse (Ueq ≤ 0) or correlation-loving (Ueq ≥ 0). Eeckhoudt, Ray, and
Schlesinger (2007) define a person to be correlation-averse if he prefers a 50-50 gamble of a
loss in his emission level or deterioration of the environment q to a 50-50 gamble loss in both
or a loss in neither. Intuitively, being correlation-averse means that by enjoying the benefit of
more emissions the country can reduce the pain of a reduction in environmental quality2 . Con-
versely, a correlation-loving country perceives an increase in emissions as exacerbating the loss
in environmental quality. Whether a country is correlation-averse or correlation-loving will be
an important ingredient in how it responds to uncertainty about environmental quality. B&T
implicitly confound risk aversion and correlation aversion (since Uee = Uqq = Ueq = u′′ < 0 in
their formulation).
The third derivatives of the utility function will also affect how a country responds to risk.
Adapting the terminology of Kimball (1990), we will say that a country is prudent with respect
to emissions if Ueee > 0, and that it is prudent with respect to environmental quality if Uqqq > 0.
However, a cross, third-order derivative will also play a role. Following Eeckhoudt, Ray, and
Schlesinger (2007), we say that a country is cross-prudent in environmental quality if Ueqq ≥ 0.
If Ueqq ≤ 0 then the country is cross-imprudent in environmental quality. A country that is cross
prudent in environmental quality level will prefer a 50−50 gamble of a random shock to emis-
sions or a non-random decrease of environmental quality to a 50−50 gamble of either keeping
2. We are paraphrasing the intuitive discussion by Eeckhoudt, Ray, and Schlesinger (2007).Formally,
let k ∈ [0,e] and c ∈ [0,q] be two constants and denote a lottery defined over the outcomes (ê, q̂) or (ĕ, q̆)
by [(ê, q̂),(ĕ, q̆)], where the outcomes occur with the same probability. Correlation aversion implies that
[(ei−k,q),(ei,q−c)] [(ei,q),(ei−k,q−c)]. They show that this is equivalent to Ueq ≤ 0 if preferences
can be represented with a utility function that is differentiable to the requisite order.
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the same levels of the two attributes or facing a random shock to emissions and a non- random
decrease in environmental quality. Intuitively, a higher emission level mitigates the negative im-
pact of the environmental risk3 . B&T implicitly confound prudence and cross-prudence (since
Ueee =Uqqq =Ueqq = u′′′ < 0 in their formulation).
3.3 Equilibria
We will consider both the emissions that would be chosen by a welfare-maximizing social
planner and the emissions determined in a Nash equilibrium.
The Social Planner
We again follow B&T, and assume that social welfare is simply the sum of the utilities of
all of the countries. Since preferences are identical we will focus, as they do, on a symmetric
profile ei = e,∀ i. The welfare metric is then simply:
W (e) = EθU [e, q̄−θd(ne)] (3.2)
A social planner maximizes welfare by equating the expected marginal benefits of emissions
with the expected marginal social costs. He therefore chooses emissions eW such that:
Eθ ϕ(eW ,θ) = EθUe[eW , q̄−θd(neW )]−nθd′(neW )Uq[eW , q̄−θd(neW )] = 0. (3.3)
3. We again are expressing the discussion of Eeckhoudt, Ray, and Schlesinger (2007) in terms of
the two goods in our model. Formally, consider the same loss in the benefit argument k ∈ [0,e] or
in environmental quality c ∈ [0,q] and now imagine random shock θ̃ to emissions. Cross prudence in
environmental quality, written in lottery form, implies that [(ei,q+ θ̃),(ei−k,q)] [(ei,q)(ei−k,q+ θ̃)].
They show that if preferences can be expressed with a utility function that has up to third-order derivatives
then this is equivalent to Ueqq ≥ 0 for all e and q.
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Notice that expected marginal costs are weighted by the number of countries, n. For future ref-
erence we note the second-order condition for the planner’s problem,
Eθ ϕe(e,θ) = Eθ [Uee−2nθd′Ueq +θ 2n2(d′)2Uqq−θd′′Uq]< 0. (3.4)
Concavity of U(e,q) and convexity of d(ne) guarantee that this is satisfied. Denote the socially
optimal level of emissions by eW .
Nash equilibrium
Now suppose that countries play a smooth game in emissions. For simplicity we focus on
a symmetric game, since asymmetric behavior is not crucial to the problem of the commons.
Each country chooses its emissions to maximize its expected utility, given the emissions of the
other countries. It does so by emitting up to the point where the marginal benefit of emitting,
EθU ie(ei,q), is equal the expected private marginal cost Eθ θd
′U iq(ei,q). This yields the first-
order conditions:
Eθ φ i(eN ,θ) = Eθ [U ie(ei,q)−θd′U iq(ei,q)] = 0 i = 1, . . . ,n (3.5)
The Nash equilibrium consists of a vector of emissions eN = (eN1 ,e
N
2 , . . . ,e
N
n ) that satisfies this
system of equations. The second-order condition for each country’s problem is:
Eθ φ iei = Eθ [U
i
ee−2θd′U ieq +θ 2(d′)2U iqq−θd′′U iq]< 0 i = 1,2, . . . ,n (3.6)
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where the arguments of the derivatives are the same as in Equation (3.5).
To prove existence and uniqueness we apply the Gale-Nikaido (1965) theorem4 . We rele-
gate the details of the derivation to Appendix H, but will need to discuss elements of it here in
order to exposit arguments that will follow later in the paper.
First, define
αi = Eθ [U iee−θd′U ieq] (3.7)
βi = Eθ [−θd′U ieq−θd′′U iq +(θd′)2U iqq] (3.8)
The Jacobian J of the system of Equations (3.5) can then be expressed as
J =

α1 +β1 β1 · · · β1





βn βn · · · αn +βn
 (3.9)
The diagonal elements of the Jacobian register the effects of each country i’s own emissions
on its net marginal benefits; αi +βi = Eθ φ iei < 0 by the by the second-order conditions of each
country’s maximization problem [this corresponds to the second-order condition for the planner
in inequality (3.4)].
4. See the lucid discussion in Friedman (1990), as well as the succinct statement of the theorem in
Sydsæter, Strøm, & Berck, 2005.
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The off-diagonal elements βi = φ ij, j 6= i, capture the effects of the emissions of other coun-
tries on the net marginal benefits of country i; if βi < 0, emissions in other countries are strategic
substitutes for those of country i, while if βi > 0 they are strategic complements. Notice that
U ieq > 0 (super-modularity) is a sufficient condition for strategic substitutability. However, if
U ieq is sufficiently negative it is possible for emissions to be strategic complements.
Since preferences are identical, an interior equilibrium must necessarily be symmetric, so
that αi = α and βi = β . In the Appendix H we prove
Proposition 1 There exists a unique, interior, symmetric Nash equilibrium eN =(eN1 ,e
N
2 , . . . ,e
N
n )
if α j−1[α + jβ ] alternates in sign negative, positive, negative,. . . , for j = 1,2, . . . ,n. Further,
these conditions will be satisfied if and only if α < 0 and α + jβ < 0.
A sufficient condition for α < 0 [see Equation (3.7)] is that, for every realization of θ , emissions
and environmental quality are complements (Ueq > 0). The restriction α + jβ < 0 is satisfied
automatically if emissions are strategic substitutes (β < 0). However, strategic complementar-
ity (β > 0) is consistent with equilibrium as long as the strength of complementarity is not too
strong. A sufficient condition for α + jβ < 0 [see Equation (3.8)] is that, for every realization
of θ , the restriction that
Uee−θd′Ueq + j[−θd′U ieq−θd′′U iq +(θd′)2U iqq]< 0. (3.10)
In other words, there will be a unique equilibrium as long as emissions are either super-modular
or not too strongly sub-modular.
In the two-dimensional case, Proposition 1 has an illuminating geometric interpretation.
Suppose that there are two countries, 1 and 2. Proposition 1 then asserts that there is a unique
equilibrium if α +β < 0 and α(α +2β )> 0. The first inequality follows from the second-order
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condition for each country. To see what the second inequality means, consider the slopes of









α+β . The condition
α(α +2β )> 0 simply requires one reaction function to be steeper than the other. Notice that if
β > 0 the reaction functions are positively sloped (See Figure 3.1).
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
(a) Strategic Substitutes, de2de1 < 0
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
(b) Strategic Complements, de2de1 > 0
Figure 3.1: Reaction Functions.
We pause to establish an obvious but important result. Since the equilibrium is symmetric
we can write U i =U and reduce the system in Equation (3.5) to the single equation
Eθ φ(eN ,θ) = EθUe[eN , q̄−θd(neN)]−θd′(neN)Uq[eN , q̄−θd(neN)] = 0. (3.11)
Each country equates the expected marginal benefit of emissions to the expected private
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costs. This should be compared to the first-order condition of the planner, in Equation (3.3),
where the expected marginal social costs are proportional to the number of countries, n. We can
then infer
Proposition 2 Emissions in the Nash equilibrium always exceed the socially optimal rate of
emissions, eN > eW .
This of course also holds in Bramoullé and Treich (2009).
3.4 Emissions and Uncertainty
Should uncertainty about the environmental damages of emissions lead countries to pollute
less? How does such uncertainty affect the rate of emissions when countries act strategically?
To address these questions we will consider the effects of an increase in risk, in the sense of
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), on the socially optimal rate of emissions and in the Nash equi-
librium.
Uncertainty and the social planner
To be precise, suppose that the distribution of θ is initially g(θ) and denote the socially
optimal emissions associated with that distribution by eWg . Let the distribution of θ change to
h(θ), where h(θ) is a mean-preserving spread of g(θ) . Denote the socially optimal emissions
associated with g(θ) by eWh . We are interested in whether the increase in risk commands a de-
crease in emissions: When is eWh < e
W
g ?
Initially, given g(θ), the planner chooses emissions so that Eθ ϕ(eWg ,θ) = 0. Intuitively, we
know from standard arguments of stochastic dominance that the mean-preserving spread will
decrease ϕ(e,θ) if ϕ(e,θ) is concave in θ , so that Eθ ϕ(eWg ,θ)< 0. If ϕ(e,θ) is decreasing in





the elegant formulation of Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky (1992), we can say more generally that
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Sign(eWg − eWh ) = Sign(ϕθθ )×Sign(ϕe) (3.12)
We know that ϕe < 0 from the second-order condition in inequality (3.4). The question therefore
reduces to assessing the sign of ϕθθ .
A little algebra reveals that




Following Dardanoni (1988) this expression can usefully be decomposed into two parts.
• The second terms in brackets corresponds to what Dardanoni (1988) calls the “uncertainty
substitution effect.” This is negative, assuming that people are risk-averse with respect
environmental quality, Uqq < 0. Risk aversion unambiguously makes socially optimal
emissions fall when uncertainty increases.
• The first two terms inside the bracket constitute what he dubs the “uncertainty income
effect.” This in turn depends upon two factors, Uqqq and Ueqq. If people are prudent
Uqqq ≥ 0 then the effect of risk aversion is reinforced. However, if people are cross-
prudent Ueqq ≥ 0 with respect to environmental quality then an increase uncertainty tends
to raise the marginal utility of emissions.
This leads to:
Proposition 3 An increase in uncertainty about the environmental damages of emissions will
increase (reduce) the socially optimal rate of emissions as Ueqq−nθd′Uqqq+2n d
′
d Uqq is positive
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(negative).
One might think that a risk-averse planner would always reduce emissions in response to en-
vironmental uncertainty. However, Proposition 3 establishes that a sufficiently cross-prudent
planner might actually increase emissions in response to greater risk about their effect on envi-
ronmental quality5 .
To make this more concrete it may help to consider a “small” risk. Define θ = θ̄ +σε ,
where E(ε) = 0 and Var(ε) = 1, so a small σ implies a small risk to θ . Define the socially
optimal rate of emissions in the absence of uncertainty (σ = 0) by ēW . Taking a Taylor-series of
Equation (3.3) around eW = ēW and around ε = 0 then yields





The functions ϕθθ and ϕe are of course evaluated at σ = 0. Since ϕe < 0, uncertainty only
reduces emissions relative to the case without uncertainty if ϕθθ < 0, as Proposition 3 asserts.
This will happen unless the country is very cross-prudent.
Uncertainty with strategic interactions
Now consider the effects of uncertainty in the Nash equilibrium. Denote the emissions in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium for the less risky distribution g(θ) by eNg and the equilibrium
emissions for the riskier distribution h(θ) by eNh . Recall from Equation (3.5) that the first-order
condition for each country i is Eθ φ i(eN ,θ) = 0.
Following the same reasoning as in the previous section it follows that the sign effect of the
increase in risk on equilibrium emissions is determined by
5. B&T attribute this ambiguity to prudence. This is because their preferences U(e+q) impose Ueqq =
Uqqq = u′′′. In fact it is cross prudence that generates the ambiguity, if people are prudent, Uqqq > 0.
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Sign(eNg − eNh ) = Sign(φθθ )×Sign(φe) (3.15)
This corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to Equation (3.3) of Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky
(1992). Consider the two terms on the right-hand side of (15) in turn.
Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky (1992, p.557) emphasize that the derivative φ i must account for
the fact that all countries are changing their emissions, as well as country i. In other words, φ ie
is the derivative of φ i with respect to the common rate of emissions eN in the symmetric equi-





ee−2θd′U ieq +(θd′)2U iqq−θd′′U iq]− (n−1)[θd′U ieq +θd′′U iq− (θd′)2U iqq] (3.16)
The first term is simply the second-order condition in Inequality (3.6), and so is negative.
The second term is the change in country i′s marginal utility of emissions caused by a change
in country j′s emissions, ∂
2U i
∂ei∂e j
. Gradstein, Nitzan, and Slutsky (1992) argue that, because U ieq
may be negative, this term is of indeterminate sign. In fact, this apparent ambiguity arises from
the fact that they assumed the existence of equilibrium; it disappears once the conditions for
existence in our Proposition 1 are imposed.
To see this, take the expectation of Equation (3.15) and apply definitions Equations (3.7) and
(3.8) to find:
Eθ φ ie = αi +βi +(n−1)βi (3.17)
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In a symmetric equilibrium, where αi = α and βi = β , this reduces to Eθ φ ie = α + nβ .
However, Proposition 1 asserts that α +nβ < 0 is a sufficient condition for the existence of the
equilibrium. Clearly, if φ ie < 0 for all realizations of θ , then Eθ φ
i
e =α+nβ < 0. However φ
i
e < 0
is exactly the restriction imposed by Equation (3.10) to guarantee existence of the equilibrium.
In other words, the sufficient condition for existence eliminates the ambiguity about the sign of
second term of Equation (3.16). Now consider φ i
θθ








This should be compared to condition (3.13), for the planner. As in that case, the “un-
certainty substitution effect,” is negative because of risk aversion. The “uncertainty income
effect” depends upon the sign of U ieqq−θd′U iqqq. Prudence with respect to environmental qual-
ity U iqqq ≥ 0 also tends to make this negative. Notice, however, that this effect is larger for the
planner, and increases with the number of countries. Cross-prudence U ieqq ≥ 0 offsets the affects
of risk aversion and prudence, and can in principal make φ i
θθ
> 0. This leads to
Proposition 4 An increase in uncertainty about the environmental damages of emissions will
increase (reduce) the emissions in the Nash equilibrium as Ueqq− nθd′Uqqq + 2n d
′
d Uqq is posi-
tive (negative).
It is again informative to express this for a small risk. If we denote the Nash equilibrium in
the absence of uncertainty by ēN , then we can say that locally





As before, both φθθ and φe are evaluated at the mean of θ . Since φe < 0 uncertainty will reduce
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emissions as long as φθθ < 0. Assuming that countries are risk averse and prudent, this will
occur as in the case of the planner - unless they are also very cross-prudent.
Equation (3.19) also tells us something else. Look at the definition of φe in Equation (3.16),
and recall that if −[θd′U ieq +θd′′U iq− (θd′)2U iqq] > 0 − in other words if βi > 0 − then emis-
sions are strategic complements. Now denote equilibrium emissions when emissions are strate-
gic substitutes by eNsub and the corresponding equilibrium when emissions are strategic comple-
ments by eNcomp. Strategic complementarity makes the denominator of the last term in Equation
(3.19) less negative, so that −φθθ
φe
will increase. We therefore have
Proposition 5 Strategic complementarity magnifies the effects of risk on emissions, and strate-









This is has a straightforward geometric interpretation, as shown in Figure 3.2. However, it
could have important policy implications: Strategic complementarity has the potential to greatly
magnify the effects of climate risk, for good or for ill. This takes us to the question of risk and
welfare.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the example when riskier damages induce each country to reduce its emis-




   
   
   
   
   
   
 
(a) Strategic Substitutes, de2de1 < 0
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
(b) Strategic Complements, de2de1 > 0
Figure 3.2: Uncertainty, Reaction Functions, & Equilibrium.
3.5 Welfare and Uncertainty
Bramoullé and Treich (2009) point out that environmental risk affects welfare both directly
(by affecting the size of the damages) and indirectly (by changing emissions). Intuitively, the
direct effect should reduce welfare. Is it possible for uncertainty to cause so much of a decline in
emissions in a strategic setting that people will be better off? To address this question, consider
the welfare function defined in Equation (3.2), but evaluated at the Nash equilibrium. Use the
same small risk introduced in the previous section, θ = θ̄ +σε , with E(ε) = 0 and Var(ε) = 1.
Welfare is then
W (eN) = nEθU [eN , q̄− (θ̄ +σε)d(neN)] (3.20)
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Take a second-order Taylor series around the risk-less Nash equilibrium eN = ēN and around
ε = 0 to find




We can apply the Envelope Theorem, however, to see that Ue− θ̄dUq = 0. We can also
employ Equation (3.19) to rewrite Equation (3.21) as









The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (3.22) is the direct effect of risk. It is
unambiguously negative because of risk aversion. Notice that its magnitude increases with the
square of the number of countries.
The first term is the strategic effect of risk. Notice that it is magnitude (in absolute value)
increases linearly with the number of countries. Recall that φe < 0. Then there are two cases to
consider, depending upon the sign of φθθ .
First suppose that φθθ < 0. Proposition 3 showed that an increase in risk will then reduce
emissions, and so tend to increase welfare. In this case the direct and indirect effects of push
in opposite directions. It is possible that welfare will actually increase. This is the possibility
considered by Bramoullé and Treich (2009).
If, however, φθθ > 0 then Proposition 3 asserts that the increase in risk will raise emissions,
and so reduce welfare. The direct and indirect effects of risk reinforce each other in reducing
welfare.
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In either case, Proposition 4 combined with Equation (3.22) tell us that the magnitude of the
effect on welfare (in absolute value) will be larger in the presence of strategic complementarity
than in the presence of strategic substitutability.
We may summarize all this with
Proposition 6 If φθθ > 0, uncertainty about the environmental damages of emissions will re-
duce welfare. If φθθ < 0, then it is possible that it will increase welfare. Furthermore, the
absolute value of the change in welfare will be greater with strategic complementarity than with
strategic substitutability.
3.6 Conclusion
We have established that an increase in uncertainty about the environmental damages of
emitting will cause emissions in the Nash equilibrium to decline if the function φθθ is negative.
This is likely to occur if people are (1) risk averse, (2) prudent, and (3) are either cross-imprudent
or not terribly cross-prudent. On introspective grounds, this seems plausible. This makes it pos-
sible a priori that risk may actually improve welfare. However, the magnitude of the reduction in
emissions will be smaller in the presence of strategic substitutability. It is intuitively plausible
(Echazu, Nocetti, & Smith, 2012) that emissions and environmental quality should be Edge-
worth complements, which requires strategic complementarity. These would tend to reduce the
benefits of reduced emissions. It must also be remembered that the strategic benefit of risk in-
creases linearly with the number of countries, while the direct effect of risk-aversion increases
with the square of the number of countries. Our priors are therefore that it is unlikely that the
net effect of environmental risk should be to increase welfare.
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CHAPTER 4
COUNTY-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED US STATES
4.1 Introduction
The 2010 US spending on hospital care, physician and clinical services, and prescription
drugs accounted for about 61% of total healthcare expenditures estimated at (Martin et al.,
2012). The national healthcare expenditure, for the same period, was estimated at $2.6 tril-
lion (or 17.9% of the Gross Domestic Product). The most conservative projection anticipates
aggregate healthcare expenditures to reach 20.3% of GDP by 2018 (Sisko et al., 2009). Al-
though prescribed drugs expenditure in 2010 represented 10% of the total health care spending
(see, Appendix I), it remains one of the fastest growing components, increasing at double digits
rates up to the early 2000s (see, Appendix J). Moreover, a further rise in drug consumption is
expected, as prescribed drugs are an effective and “cheaper” treatment technology.1 This is
in addition to the expansionary effects on prescription drugs consumption arising from greater
insurance coverage and benefits2 due to the 2006 Medicare Part D drug benefits and the 2010
Affordable Care Act.
Therefore, to contain the impending US healthcare expenditure upsurge a better understand-
ing of the core drivers of prescription drugs consumption is necessary and timely. Specifically,
this present research, the first to use (the most recent) county level data, also tests the flexible
Box-Cox transformations model against its a priori restrictive nested forms (traditionally used
in this line of work) for separately investigating the drivers of prescription drugs consumption
in low, average, and high consumption US states. Following Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2012),
six selected US states were grouped into three convergence clubs of their prescription drug ex-
1. Lichtenberg,1996, shows that an increase of 100 prescriptions results in 16.3 times hospital days,
and that $1 increase in pharmaceutical expenditure results in $3.65 reduction in hospital care expenditure
2. For example, our priors have found that Medicare Part-D plans have succeeded in lowering by
approximately 20% out-of-prices for enrollees (Duggan & Scott-Morton, 2010) and have increased uti-
lization of pharmaceutical treatment (Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007).
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penditures: High (Tennessee), Average (Arkansas and N. Dakota) and Low (Idaho, S. Dakota
and Washington). Given the heterogeneity in pharmaceutical healthcare expenditures across the
clubs, modeling the aggregate county-level data of the states would yield biased and inefficient
econometric model parameter estimates and engender faulty policy inferences.
The remainder of this research proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature
on the determinants of prescription drugs consumption. Section 3 presents the data and re-
search methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 5
concludes with the policy inferences of the study findings.
4.2 Previous Literature
Health factors: The percentage of individuals with a BMI greater than 30, the percent-
age of adults reporting smoking, and the percentage of adults reporting a fair or poor health
are three health behavior and health status factors. A number of diseases (e.g., sleep apnea,
cardiovascular, hypertension, diabetes, and all type of cancer linked to obesity translates into
greater prescription drugs consumption (Vandergrift & Datta, 2006). Kit et al. (2012) find that,
between 2005 and 2008, 56.4% of the US adults consume one or more prescribed medication,
and a quarter of those prescriptions were for hypertension related illnesses (e.g., clinical depres-
sion and diabetes). Consequently, each of these three health factors is a priori expected to raise
prescribed drugs consumption.
Access factors: County-level total prescription drugs consumption is likely to increase both
with greater number of pharmacies and other health care providers. Okunade and Suraratdecha
(2006), looking at selected OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Italy, and UK), conclude that
pharmaceutical spending increases with the number of physicians.3 This could be justified by
the “hypothesis of provider-induced demand for healthcare services” which states that because
of reimbursement schemes (See, Weiner et al., 1991, Lavizzo-Mourey and Eisenberg, 1990)
3. Suraratdecha (1996), however, using 1980-1990 pooled data of the US states, report an insignificant
linkage of per capita physician expenditure to per capital prescription spending
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and for job security reasons, medical care personnel may have incentives to prescribe “unneces-
sary”F treatments for patients. Medical care personnel being potential enablers (see Granlund
& Rudholm, 2012; Karatzas, 1992) the primary care provider and the mental health provider
rates are likely to raise prescription drugs consumption. Similarly, greater access to community
pharmacies at the county level could also increase Prescription drugs consumption.
Socio-economic factors: There is evidence in the healthcare literature indicating that a rise
in the median household income leads to greater prescription drugs spending (Murillo & Saez,
1994; Newhouse, 1977 ). Alexander et al., (1994) report the US income elasticity for ethical
drugs to be close to 1.79. Income can have both a direct and an indirect effect on prescrip-
tion drugs consumption. The direct effect states that wealthier individuals tend to have greater
concerns for their health (Benezeval & Judge, 2001; Grossman& Kaestner, 1997). Thus, they
are expected to encounter the healthcare system more frequently. The indirect effect expects
individuals with higher incomes to have better insurance coverage benefits to purchase more
pharmaceutical goods (Leibowitz et al., 1985). Brow (2004), in his study of the impact that
the US income inequality has on consumption, concludes that a rising income inequality leads
to falling consumption. Consequently, we here test for the first time in the specific context of
ethical drugs consumption the role of income inequality, captured using GINI coefficients.
Individuals with more education tend to have a better health status and they consume more pre-
scription drugs. They are able to efficiently transform health information into improved health
status. They also place more emphasis on preventive care and have greater access to health
services. Also, greater formal schooling comes with higher earnings. We can thus, hypothesize
prescription drugs consumption to also increase with education level (Lichtenberg and Lleras-
Muney, 2005). More specifically, Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) find that income, insurance
and family background account for about 30% of the education gradient.
Demographic factors: Population aging is associated with greater susceptibility to illnesses
and the need for contacts with the healthcare system, including prescription drugs. Moreover,
women generally tend to use the healthcare system more frequently than men. This tendency
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emanates from two possible sources. First, women have higher life expectancies4 and therefore
have longer contacts and duration with the healthcare system. Second, women often use health
services for gender-related issues such as fertility and fecundity related concerns (Hunt-Mccool
et al., 1997). With the longer and more frequent encounters with the healthcare system, an in-
crease in the female population could increase prescription drugs consumption (Cylus et. al.,
2010). Gu et al., (2010), reporting on the prescription drugs used in the US, claim that the per-
centage of individuals in the US population using at least one prescription medication between
2007 and 2008 was about 10 points higher for women (53.3 versus 43.2 for men).
Many studies in the healthcare literature find racial disparities in both access and usage of
health services (See, Reed et al., 2003; Schneider et al., 2002). Schore et al., (2003) study of
Black and White Medicaid pharmacy use concludes that in 8 out of the 10 states studied, Black
beneficiaries have significantly fewer prescriptions filled. Similar results were found for the
Medicare beneficiaries where Black and Hispanic population groups use 10 to 40% fewer medi-
cations than their White counterpart. In this current study, an increase in the minority population
proportion is expected to reduce prescription drugs consumption.
4.3 Data and Methodology
Data
The six states (Arkansas, Idaho, N. Dakota, S. Dakota, Tennessee and Washington) consid-
ered in this study are partitioned into three regions (Low, Average, and High) based on conver-
gence5 of their prescription drug expenditures. Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2012) study conver-
gence in the different components of the aggregate healthcare expenditure for the US states, and
conclude the existence of four separate convergence clubs (See, Appendix K) for prescription
drugs spending. For this study, the low spending states belonging to a convergence club com-
prise Idaho (44 counties), S. Dakota (66 counties), and Washington (39 counties). The average
spending states, belonging to a separate convergence club, comprise Arkansas (75 counties) and
4. Xu et al., (2010) find that the US girls born in 2008 are expected to live 80.3 years, compare to 75.2
for boys
5. The notion of convergence in healthcare expenditures is similar to that of income convergence in
neoclassical growth models (Solow, 1956).
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N. Dakota (53 counties). Finally, a separate convergence club comprises the high spending state
of Tennessee (95 counties).6
Data for study are from two main sources. First is the 2011 SK&A7 National Pharmacy
Market Report on counts of prescriptions filled and the number of pharmacies in each county.
The data cover surveys of 4,251 community pharmacies across the low, average, and high pre-
scription drugs consumption clubs. Second, data on the controlling health factors were ob-
tained from The University of Wisconsin Population and Health Institute’s County Level Rank-
ings. These factors are grouped into four internally consistent categories: demographics, health,
socio-economic, and access. Table 4.1 is a summary presentation of the main variables used in
this study.
Table 4.1: Prescription drugs Data Variables and Sources
Variables Source
Prescription volume (Rx) SK&A National Pharmacy Market Report
Health
Percent of adults reporting fair or poor health
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System
Percent of adults smoking ≥ 100 cigarettes
Percent of adults that report a BMI ≥ 30 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Access
Primary Care Provider rate per 100K (PCP)
Health Resources & Services Administration
Mental Health Provider rate (MHP)
Number of Pharmacies (Pharmacies) SK&A
% of population ≤age 65 without insurance Small Area Health Insurance Estimates
Socio-Econ
% of adults with post-secondary education (PSED) American Community Survey
% of 16+ years old unemployed (Unemployed) Bureau of Labor Statistics
Median household income (Income)
Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates
% of children ≤ age 18 in poverty
Demographic
% 65 and older (P65)
US Census Bureau




6. Our dataset comprises a total of 372 counties
7. SK&A is part of Cegedim family, a global Technology and Services Company specialized in health-
care.
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Summary statistics in Table 4.2 indicate that when compared to the other regions, those in
high convergence club counties tend to consume more prescriptions, are less healthy, have less
access to physicians, are less educated and have higher poverty rates.





Prescription per capita 1.603 1.566 1.521 1.558
Health
Smokers 25.031 21.504 18.503 20.858
Obese 32.768 32.273 30.154 31.551
Fair-Poor health 21.838 16.975 14.301 16.971
Access
PCP 76.074 97.421 103.484 93.701
Pharmacies 16.659 8.051 13.626 12.503
Uninsured 21.863 22.281 22.517 22.269
Socio-Econ
PSED 42.379 54.766 57.306 52.62
Income 37,784.04 39,349.57 43,006.06 40,414.33
Children in Poverty 29.526 25.852 22.758 25.551
Unemployed 11.301 6.81 7.742 8.33
Demographics
Population 27,627.30 60,552.88 50,685.29 66,276.36
P65 15.427 18.028 16.142 16.609
Black 7.585 9.696 0.714 5.559
Hispanic 2.88 3.363 7.441 4.873
Female 50.625 50.306 49.77 50.173
Rural 68.808 72.965 66.118 69.161
Methodology
Healthcare data including prescription drugs consumption and health expenditures tend to
be skewed. As a result, the commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation method will
be inefficient. Therefore, it is important, in order to make correct policy inferences, to opt for
an estimation technique which can accommodate the skewed data distribution of the response
variable. For investigating the relationship between prescription drug counts and its explanatory
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variables, we propose using the more flexible Box-Cox (Box & Cox, 1964) power family of
transformations model for normalizing the response distribution and for selecting the appropri-
ate functional form for modeling each convergence club data. The Box-Cox model is as follows:




= β0 +β1X1i +β2X2i +β3X3i +β4Z if λ 6= 0
Log(Y ) = β0 +β1X1i +β2X2i +β3X3i +β4Z if λ = 0
(4.1)
where Yi is the Prescription drugs volume in county i; X ji, respectively, are the health, access,
and economic factors ( j = 1, ..,4); Z is set of control variables; εi the independent and normally
distributed random variables with constant variance and zero mean, and λ is estimated optimal
parameter of the Box-Cox transformation based on maximum likelihood criterion.
To test whether the variables across the three clubs are statistically different, we conduct a
multivariate analysis of variance. The corresponding p-levels of the MANOVA F statistics show
that prescription drugs and most of the control variables are significantly different for the three
convergence club regions (see, Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Multivariate Analysis of Variances Between Clubs
Variables F-Statistic Pr > F N
Prescription 2.65 0.0724 340
Health factors
Smokers 29.45 <.0001 324
Obese 18.92 <.0001 372
Fair-Poor health 59.64 <.0001 346
Access
PCP 4.82 0.0087 334
Pharmacies 2.59 0.0768 340
Uninsured 3.08 0.0471 372
Socio-Economic
PSED 48.59 <.0001 372
Income 14.35 <.0001 372
Children in poverty 16.77 <.0001 372
Demographic
P65 9.54 <.0001 372
Black 27.48 <.0001 372
Hispanic 16.83 <.0001 372
Female 8.78 0.0002 372
Rural 1.89 0.153 372
4.4 Empirical Results
As earlier stated the Box-Cox power family of transformations technique is used to stabilize
the variances and it transform data to normality by pulling in the tails of the distribution. The λ
power transformation parameter estimate for our dependent variable (count prescription drugs)
was first determined for the entire data and then separately for each convergence club data set.
Table 4.4 contains the log-likelihood (LL) ratio statistic (LR Stat) results for testing the statistical
significance of lambda λ equal to −1 (inverse), 0 (log), and 1 (linear) functional forms against
the estimated λ ∗, considered optimal using the unrestricted Box-Cox transformation regres-
sions. The Box-Cox procedure outputs optimal λ estimates (at the lowest log-likelihood score
statistic) to be 0.217 for the pooled data model, 0.567 for the high convergence club model,
0.696 for the average expenditure convergence club data, and 0.087 for the lowest expenditure
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convergence club areas. Other than for the lowest convergence club8 states model the optimal
model λ estimates reject fitting of the traditionally restricted log or linear functional forms (see,
Appendix L). Graphical displays of the Box-Cox transformation models yielding optimal λ val-
ues are in Appendix M - P.
Table 4.4: Testing The Box-Cox Transformation Model Against Nested Forms





















Applying Equation 1, the estimated λ s of the Box-Cox procedure are then used to transform
our dependent variable. Table 4.5 summarizes the findings. The highly significant dummy vari-
ables controlling for the low and average convergence club memberships, in the first column of
Table 4.5, indicate the need to estimate separate models for the three clubs. For Tennessee coun-
ties (high spenders), we included dummies for testing the existence of any differences in east
8. For λ = 0 the log-likelihood ratio test statistic suggests a log transformation of the response variable
for the low expenditure convergence club observations.
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(wealthier) and middle Tennessee relative to west Tennessee counties (poorest areas), and found
no significant differences in prescription drugs consumption. In the low prescription expendi-
ture convergence region, the model estimation results confirm prescription drugs consumption
as significant less in the states of Idaho and S. Dakota relative to Washington. Also, for the
average spending region, drugs consumption in Arkansas counties is significantly higher than
in N. Dakota. In general, the adjusted R2 values indicate that the right hand side variables in the
estimated models capture a most of the variations in ethical drugs consumption at the county
level. Since the dependent variable is power transformed, interpretation of the coefficient esti-
mates is not straightforward. Therefore Appendix Q contains the computed marginal effects for
the significant variables in high and average spending club regions.
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Table 4.5: Box-Cox Regression Model Estimates By Convergence Clubs
Pooled Model High Spenders Average Spenders Low Spenders
λ̂ 0.21689 0.56794 0.69565 0.08681
Intercept -13.55 -108.8 186.7 10.17∗∗
(-0.55) (-0.08) (0.04) (2.41)
Health Factors
Obese -0.0402 -9.737 16.19 0.0102
(-0.28) (-1.06) (0.74) (0.39)
Smokers 0.225∗∗ -2.772 10.24 0.0657∗∗∗
(2.57) (-0.57) (0.57) (3.19)
Fair-Poor 0.0151 1.553 -48.63∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗
(0.11) (0.21) (-3.35) (-2.13)
Access to Care
PCP 0.0203∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 0.476 0.00442∗∗∗
(2.84) (3.64) (0.83) (3.37)
Uninsured 0.288 20.61 -35.16 0.0127
(1.59) (1.57) (-1.27) (0.39)
Pharmacies 0.247∗∗∗ 27.91∗∗∗ 177.9∗∗∗ 0.00877∗
(4.70) (27.45) (21.24) (1.96)
Socio-Economics
PSED 0.00476 4.099 22.94∗∗ -0.00517
(0.07) (1.15) (2.20) (-0.42)
Income 0.000682∗ 0.0359∗∗ -0.0940 0.0000112
(1.77) (2.50) (-0.95) (0.12)
Income2 -5.56E-09 -3.31. E-7∗∗∗ 8.77E-7 -8.61E-11
(-1.55) (-3.13) (0.83) (-0.10)
GINI -0.0237 -6.556 49.35 -0.0516
(-0.13) (-0.48) (1.35) (-1.51)
Demographics
Black -0.117∗∗∗ -4.156 -24.04∗∗∗ 0.156
(-2.70) (-1.51) (-3.18) (1.40)
Hispanic -0.0949 -17.31 -23.23∗ 0.00819
(-1.06) (-1.22) (-1.78) (0.43)
P65 -0.516∗∗∗ -1.970 -89.46∗∗ -0.0336
(-4.03) (-0.15) (-2.51) (-1.49)
Female 0.852∗∗ 4.700 45.16 0.0746
(2.44) (0.36) (0.44) (1.40)
Rural -0.220∗∗∗ -5.904∗∗∗ -9.832∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗
















Number of Counties 271 59 94 118
Adj. R2 0.817 0.988 0.960 0.741
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
Recall that Box-Cox β = (X ′X)−1(X ′Y )(λ ) where Y (λ ) = (Y λ −1)λ
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Effects of health behavioral factors
Surprisingly for the high spenders club, population health status does not have a statistically
significant impact on prescription drugs consumption. This could be explained by the club’s
inherently poor population health status and low socio-economic conditions (e.g., lack of health
knowledge) as barriers for accessing adequate medical care services. For example, a percentage
point rise in adults reporting fair or poor health reduces prescription drugs consumption 11.3%,
and a one percent rise in the number of smokers raises prescribed drugs consumption 6.57%.
Access factors
The access to care variables appear to be the most significant factors driving prescription
drugs consumption across the three convergence spending clubs. If primary care providers in-
crease by 1 per 100,000 of the population it would significantly raise the prescription drugs con-
sumption in Tennessee by 252 count units and by 0.44% for the low spenders club. Controlling
for other factors, these findings could suggest that doctors in these counties are more generous
prescribers. Moreover, the presence of an additional pharmacy in a county significantly in-
creases total annual consumption of prescribed drugs by 4422 in the high spending club area, by
4739 in the average spending states, and by 0.87% in the low spending club region. The signif-
icantly higher estimate in the average spending area reflects the fewer pharmacies per 100,000
of the population in its counties (i.e., 13.295 per 100,000 versus 23.883 per 100,000 in the low
and 60.299 per 100,000 in the high spending states).
Socio-economic factors
Intuitively, we anticipate the more highly educated to transform health information into bet-
ter health status, to have better access to health services, and have greater concern for their
health. Our estimation results are only significant for the average spending club region. A
percentage point increase of adults with post secondary education in this region raises annual
prescription drugs consumption by 611 counts.
Prescription drugs consumption significantly increases with income at a decreasing rate in the
low spending club areas. Further, the income elasticities for prescription drugs consumption
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is positive and less than one (for computation, see, Appendix R), suggesting that prescription
drugs are a necessity, as anticipated. The estimated income elasticity for the aggregated model
(0.461) indicates that prescription drug is a necessity in general. However, we found an income
elasticity of 0.535 for the high spending Tennessee. These different findings across the conver-
gence club areas attest to the need to consider modeling homogeneous regions, as in the present
study.
Moreover, while not statistically significant but correctly signed, our model results suggest
that rising income inequalities reduces prescription drugs consumption in the three convergence
club spending groups. This effect points to the tendency for greater public sector prescription
drug subsidies in areas of large income disparities, which would naturally lead to further in-
creases in healthcare spending.
Demographics
If the percentage of Blacks in a county increases by one percent, prescription drugs con-
sumption diminishes 640 in the average spending states. Similarly, a percent point increase in
Hispanics reduces consumption by 620 units. Moreover, a higher rural population percentage
is associated with lower prescription drugs use. Specifically, a percent increase in rural popula-
tion reduces prescription drugs usage by 935, 267, and by 2.43%, respectively in high, average
and low spending club areas. One possibility is the tendency for the rural population to engage
in the use of more alternative or traditional medicines. To further investigate the most potent
drivers of prescription drugs consumption, across the convergence clubs, we compute the beta
coefficient (see, Appendix R). The standardized beta coefficients signal that the number of phar-
macies (that is, an access variable), the median household income (that is, an economic factor),
and the percent of rural population (a demographic factor) in a given county are the most potent
factors determining prescription drugs consumption.
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4.5 Conclusion
The primary goal of this research was to determine the core drivers of US prescription drugs
consumption. The analyses were conducted for three different groups (high, average, and low)
of prescription drugs consumers. Based on their convergence in prescription drug expenditures,
six selected states were partitioned as follows: Tennessee in the high, Arkansas and N. Dakota
in the average, and Idaho, S. Dakota and Washington in the low spending region.
Given the tendency for healthcare data to be skewed, we anticipated that fitting the com-
monly used linear and log-linear functional forms to our data can lead to erroneous regression
model parameter estimates and misleading policy inferences. To determine the best model for
each region, we applied the more flexible Box-Cox transformations model, using 2011 county
data. Our aggregate data model findings significantly differ from those of the individual conver-
gence club regions. The Box-Cox transformation estimates of the optimal lambdas also differ
across regions. This attests to the need to consider separately modeling data of internally homo-
geneous regions in healthcare consumption, expenditure, or cost studies.
Several additional conclusions derive from our regression model estimate. First, more in
depth consideration should be given to access to care measures as they have the most signifi-
cant impact on the degree to which individuals consume ethical drugs. The wider the access to
community pharmacies in a county the more likely is the population to use prescription drugs.
Second, the results suggest that primary care providers in the high and low spending states tend
to prescribe more. Therefore, in order to reduce provider induced demand, stricter controls
could be implemented in high and low consumption club areas. Third, income increases pre-
scription drugs consumption at a decreasing rate in high and low spending regions. The median
household income is only significant in Tennessee and the income elasticities indicate that pre-
scription drugs are a necessity. This calls for implementing specific health policy reforms in the
high spending region. Moreover, in order to contain high US healthcare spending, it is impor-
tant to reduce income inequalities. Fourth, minority and rural population groups, on average,
consume less prescription drugs than their White and urban counterparts.
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This study is the first insightful analysis of the determinants of prescribed drugs consump-
tion based on 2011 county level data of low, average, and high expenditure convergence club
states in the US. One potentially fruitful avenue for future work is expanding the county-level
data coverage and model estimations for specific income quintiles, age profiles, and ethnic
groups to include all of the counties in the six US pharmaceutical spending convergence club
states. An interesting question would be to investigate the impact the length of physician’s
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APPENDIX A Health Outcomes Variables and Sources
MEASURES SOURCES
OUTCOMES
Mortality Premature death rateYears of potential life lost before age 75 (YPLL-75) Vital Statistics, National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
Morbidity
Mean physically unhealthy days/month for adults
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
Mean mentally unhealthy days/month for adults
Percent of live births with low birth weight (< 2500g) Vital Statistics, NCHS
FACTORS
Health behavior
Percent of adults that report smoking at least 100 cigarettes and that they currently smoke BRFSS
Percent of adults that report a BMI ≥ 30 CDC, National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion
Teen birth rate/ 1,000 female 15−19 Vital Statistics, NCHS
Access to Care
Percent of population < age65 without health insurance CCPS, Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE)
Primary care provider rate per 100K (PCP) Health Resources and Services Administration, Area Resource File (ARF)
Mental health providers (MHP) Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA)
Quality of Care
Hospitalization rate for ambulatory-care sensitive conditions per 1,000 Medicare enrollees ( ACSC)
Medicare claims/Dartmouth Atlas
Percent of diabetic Medicare enrollees that receive HbA1c screening ( HbA1c)
Education
Averaged freshman graduation ratePercent of ninth grade cohort that graduates in 4 years ( AFGR) National Center for Education Statistics
Percent of population age 25+ with 4 year college degree or higher Decennial Census, American Community Survey
Employment Percent of population age 16+ unemployed but seeking work Local Area Unemployment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Poverty
Percent of children in poverty Census/CPSSmall Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE)
Gini coefficient of income inequality Decennial Census
Family and Social Support
Percent of adults without social/emotional support BRFSS
Percent of all households that are single-parent households Decennial Census, ACS
Environmental Quality
Annual number of unhealthy air quality days due to ozone
CDC-Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Collaboration
Annual number of unhealthy air quality days due to fine particulate matter
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Notes Appendix B-E
The estimation outputs labels are as follows:
(i) The joint regression
(ii) The joint regression with region dummy
(iii) The disaggregated regressions, by region
(iv) The disaggregated regressions, by region, with a set of control variables
(v) The disaggregated regressions, by region, with a set of control variables, and state fixed
effect
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APPENDIX B: Premature Death Rate Estimations Output
Variables (i) (ii)
(iii) (iv) (v)
NE S NE S NE S
Intercept 8.598∗∗∗ 8.692∗∗∗ 8.469∗∗∗ 9.059∗∗∗ 187.6∗∗∗ 98.60∗∗∗ 179.8∗∗∗ 108.2∗∗∗
(-141.63) (-154.66) (-48.28) (-141.93) (-10.28) (-7.23) (-12.82) (-6.34)
Obese 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0172∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗
(-33.91) (-26) (-15.96) (-18.9) (-13.4) (-15.99) (-9.32) (-6.44)
Uninsured 0.00398∗∗∗ -0.00434∗∗∗ 0.00213 -0.00580∗∗∗ -0.00804∗∗∗ -0.00449∗∗∗ -0.00765∗∗ -0.00549∗∗
(-6.5) (-6.19) (-1.32) (-7.63) (-6.25) (-5.27) (-4.43) (-4.49)
PCP 0.0000566 -0.000026 0.000252∗ 0.000147 0.0000506 0.0000845 -0.00000968 0.000132
(-0.91) (-0.41) (-2.06) (-1.88) (-0.41) (-1.04) (-0.05) (-0.88)
MHP -0.000260∗∗∗ -0.000131∗∗∗ -0.0000969∗∗∗ -0.00145∗∗∗ -0.0000964∗∗∗ -0.00106∗∗∗ -0.0000753∗∗∗ -0.000846∗∗
(-5.05) (-6.15) (-7.35) (-5.94) (-9.40) (-4.89) (-12.08) (-4.39)
ACSC 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.00129∗∗∗ 0.00263∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.00204∗∗∗ 0.00112∗∗∗ 0.00226∗∗ 0.00103∗∗∗
(-12.05) (-13.26) (-7.56) (-11.4) (-7.04) (-11.05) (-4.76) (-4.67)
HBA1C -0.00498∗∗∗ -0.00443∗∗∗ -0.00529∗∗∗ -0.00406∗∗∗ -0.00331∗∗ -0.00328∗∗∗ -0.00330∗ -0.00230∗∗
(-10.43) (-10.13) (-3.38) (-9.04) (-2.59) (-7.12) (-2.38) (-3.52)
AFGR -0.00410∗∗∗ -0.00290∗∗∗ -0.00432∗∗∗ -0.00287∗∗∗ -0.00190∗∗ -0.00177∗∗∗ -0.00392∗∗ -0.00162
(-13.79) (-9.87) (-4.95) (-9.32) (-2.98) (-5.09) (-3.95) (-2.11)
Unemployed 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.00503∗∗∗ 0.00794 0.00340∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00177 0.0202∗ 0.00543
(-7.72) (-4.02) (-1.92) (-2.65) (-3.85) (-1.38) (-3.1) (-1.96)
Singleparent -0.000920∗∗ 0.000625∗ 0.000478 0.00114∗∗∗ 0.00421∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00332∗∗ 0.00259∗∗∗
(-3.17) (-2.24) (-0.62) (-3.82) (-5.61) (-7.01) (-4.57) (-5.94)
Ozone-days -0.00324∗∗∗ -0.00318∗∗∗ 0.00208∗ -0.00498∗∗∗ 0.00142 -0.00342∗∗∗ 0.00085 -0.00367∗
(-6.34) (-5.80) (-2.02) (-7.79) (-1.5) (-5.10) (-0.68) (-2.86)
Region 0.238∗∗∗
(-22.38)
Over65 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.00762∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.00744∗
(-12.23) (-8.35) (-6.81) (-3.1)
Female 0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0000765 0.0112∗ 0.000334
(-3.54) (-0.04) (-2.56) (-0.15)
Rural 0.00143∗∗∗ 0.000214 0.000883∗ 0.000469
(-6.55) (-1.53) (-2.42) (-1.46)
Hispanic 0.0000135 -0.000985∗∗∗ -0.000774 -0.000337
-0.01 (-3.46) (-0.62) (-1.29)
Black 0.00741∗∗∗ 0.000686∗∗ 0.00701∗∗ 0.000935
(-8.44) (-2.82) (-3.58) (-1.71)
Year -0.0897∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0856∗∗∗ -0.0495∗∗∗
(-9.89) (-6.58) (-12.32) (-5.83)
N 3791 3791 706 3085 706 3085 706 3085
R2 0.580 0.640 0.540 0.464 0.738 0.503 0.696 0.387
Ad j−R2 0.579 0.639 0.533 0.462 0.732 0.500 0.689 0.384
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
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APPENDIX C: Physically Unhealthy Days per Month Estimations Output
Variables (i) (ii)
(iii) (iv) (v)
NE S NE S NE S
Intercept 0.982*** 1.065*** 1.068*** 1.209*** 110.7*** 74.04*** 99.22*** 69.56*
(19.04) (20.21) (11.02) (17.79) (4.82) (4.05) (4.81) (3.03)
Obese 0.0120*** 0.00787*** 0.00797*** 0.00778*** 0.0110*** 0.0167*** 0.0126** 0.0168***
(10.88) (6.49) (3.87) (5.41) (5.43) (10.41) (4.48) (6.7)
Uninsured -0.000138 -0.00455*** -0.0025 -0.00521*** -0.00452** -0.00622*** -0.00607 -0.00585*
(-0.18) (-4.55) (-1.74) (-4.54) (-2.65) (-4.92) (-2.26) (-2.77)
PCP -0.000612*** -0.000651*** -0.000250* -0.000794*** -0.000317*** -0.000554*** -0.000390** -0.000553**
(-8.17) (-8.59) (-2.45) (-8.26) (-3.36) (-5.72) (-3.63) (-3.34)
ACSC 0.00121*** 0.00120*** 0.00277*** 0.00108*** 0.00229*** 0.000723*** 0.00280*** 0.000816*
(6.88) (6.93) (5.42) (6.01) (4.41) (3.98) (9.95) (2.71)
AFGR -0.00108** -0.000497 -0.00313*** -0.000216 -0.00272*** -0.00124** -0.00309** -0.00161*
(-2.96) (-1.34) (-4.24) (-0.52) (-3.60) (-2.73) (-4.12) (-2.74)
Unemployed 0.0132*** 0.0106*** 0.00429 0.0107*** 0.000249 0.0113*** 0.00142 0.0121*
(-8.2) (-6.54) (-0.97) (-6.23) (-0.05) (-6.1) (-0.19) (-2.89)
Singleparent -0.00187*** -0.00104** 0.00139 -0.00138** 0.00537*** 0.00145* 0.00473** 0.00121
(-4.92) (-2.63) (1.54) (-3.07) (4.82) (2.38) (3.29) (1.43)
Ozone-days -0.00354*** -0.00352*** -0.00135 -0.00411*** 0.0015 -0.00287*** 0.00263 -0.00256*
(-6.93) (-6.69) (-1.42) (-6.47) (1.4) (-4.66) (2.01) (-2.77)
Region 0.112***
(8.96)
Over65 0.00712** 0.00475*** 0.0106* 0.00395
(2.74) (3.72) (2.36) (1.35)
Female 0.0149* -0.0015 0.00973 -0.00145
(2.56) (-0.69) (1.41) (-0.49)
Rural 0.000291 0.000476* -0.000279 0.00038
(0.95) (2.42) (-0.35) (0.9)
Hispanic 0.00402*** -0.000369 0.00365** -0.00088
(4.24) (-0.93) (3.88) (-1.44)
Black -0.00408*** -0.00402*** -0.00387* -0.00386**
(-5.34) (-11.16) (-3.20) (-4.38)
Year -0.0550*** -0.0363*** -0.0492*** -0.0341*
(-4.82) (-3.99) (-4.82) (-2.99)
N 3543 3543 696 2847 696 2847 696 2847
R2 0.224 0.241 0.257 0.167 0.337 0.219 0.349 0.173
Ad j−R2 0.222 0.239 0.247 0.164 0.322 0.215 0.335 0.169
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
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APPENDIX D: Mentally Unhealthy Days per Month Estimations Output
Variables (i) (ii)
(iii) (iv) (v)
NE S NE S NE S
Intercept 1.252*** 1.275*** 1.204*** 1.378*** 140.9*** 57.84** 134.2*** 64.41**
(20.64) (20.59) (10.8) (17.34) (5.63) (2.69) (5.05) (3.35)
Obese 0.00691*** 0.00567*** 0.0117*** 0.00353* 0.0112*** 0.0146*** 0.0103* 0.0138***
(6) (4.46) (5.45) (2.18) (5.05) (7.81) (3.03) (5.54)
Uninsured -0.00390*** -0.00527*** -0.00536** -0.00564*** -0.00899*** -0.00428** -0.0103* -0.00656**
(-4.28) (-4.44) (-2.95) (-4.15) (-3.67) (-2.63) (-3.09) (-3.28)
MPH -0.000112** -0.0000929** -0.0000689* -0.00074 -0.0000616* 0.0000459 -0.0000501*** 0.000317
(-2.82) (-2.63) (-2.42) (-1.91) (-2.10) (0.13) (-6.83) (0.95)
PCP -0.000593*** -0.000607*** -0.000470*** -0.000539*** -0.000459*** -0.000638*** -0.000584* -0.000687***
(-7.53) (-7.71) (-4.14) (-4.07) (-3.81) (-4.71) (-2.77) (-6.07)
AFGR -0.00139** -0.00120** -0.00276*** -0.00107* -0.00210* -0.00245*** -0.00377* -0.00283**
(-3.13) (-2.63) (-3.31) (-2.15) (-2.25) (-4.48) (-3.06) (-3.59)
Unemployed 0.00833*** 0.00751*** 0.00284 0.00769*** 0.00082 0.00909*** 0.00226 0.0105**
(4.25) (3.76) (0.5) (3.63) (0.13) (4.17) (0.2) (3.35)
Singleparent -0.000713 -0.000457 0.00146 -0.000506 0.00622*** 0.00116 0.00580* 0.00151**
(-1.63) (-1.00) (1.47) (-0.96) (5.42) (1.6) (3.01) (3.91)
Ozone-days -0.00105 -0.00104 0.00146 -0.00149* 0.00367** -0.000901 0.00388* 0.000143
(-1.92) (-1.89) (1.4) (2.27) (2.64) (1.32) (3.09) (0.14)
Region 0.0361*
(2.54)
Over65 0.0116*** 0.00445** 0.0127** 0.00368
(3.94) (3.01) (3.31) (1.82)
Female -0.00726 0.00314 -0.0125 0.000423
(-0.93) (1.16) (-1.49) (0.11)
Rural -0.000151 -0.000671** -0.000763 -0.000815*
(0.40) (-2.75) (-1.80) (-2.93)
Hispanic 0.000457 -0.00216*** -0.000418 -0.00238***
-0.36 (-3.85) (-0.50) (-5.26)
Black -0.00168 -0.00448*** -0.00155 -0.00575***
(-1.59) (-10.12) (-0.85) (-6.66)
Year -0.0694*** -0.0283** -0.0659*** -0.0314**
(-5.58) (-2.64) (-4.96) (-3.28)
N 3560 3560 696 2864 696 2864 696 2864
R2 0.068 0.07 0.168 0.055 0.232 0.103 0.234 0.089
Ad j−R2 0.066 0.067 0.159 0.052 0.216 0.099 0.218 0.085
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
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APPENDIX E: Low Birth Weight Rates Estimations Output
Variables (i) (ii)
(iii) (iv) (v)
NE S NE S NE S
Intercept 1.607*** 1.687*** 1.887*** 1.734*** 39.67* 9.238 59.20* 11.32
(43.37) (46.39) (24.28) (41.03) (2.36) (0.95) (2.51) (1.07)
Obese 0.0211*** 0.0180*** 0.00208 0.0206*** 0.00857*** 0.00668*** 0.00639** 0.00418*
(25.4) (21.58) (1.1) (22.7) (5.48) (7.93) (3.43) (2.39)
Teenbirth 0.00206*** 0.00136*** 0.00435*** 0.00127*** 0.00216*** 0.00177*** 0.00200* 0.00208***
(12.23) (7.77) (7.74) (6.94) (4.14) (10.43) (3.01) (8.24)
Uninsured -0.00154** -0.00483*** -0.000693 -0.00476*** -0.00345* -0.00372*** -0.00606* -0.00453***
(-3.02) (-8.45) (-0.51) (-7.63) (-2.39) (-6.23) (-2.65) (-5.60)
PCP 0.000345*** 0.000303*** -0.0000291 0.000378*** -0.000244*** 0.000141* -0.000153 0.0000566
(5.15) (4.86) (-0.34) (5.96) (-3.82) (2.29) (-1.02) (-0.51)
AFGR -0.00390*** -0.00357*** -0.00161* -0.00364*** 0.00013 -0.000946*** -0.00061 -0.000194
(-15.18) (-14.10) (-2.19) (-13.42) (-0.22) (-3.85) (-0.62) (-0.51)
Unemployed 0.00652*** 0.00441*** 0.00136 0.00404*** 0.00517 0.0000645 0.00738 -0.00182
(5.58) (3.79) (0.34) (3.32) (1.44) (0.06) (1.68) (-0.90)
Singleparent 0.00180*** 0.00253*** 0.00180* 0.00251*** 0.000718 0.00128*** 0.00133* 0.00168**
(6.88) (9.5) (2.46) (8.78) (1.11) (4.16) (3.02) (4.47)
Pm-days 0.00769*** 0.00772*** 0.00921*** 0.00666*** 0.00140** 0.000838 0.000784 0.000671
(8.96) (9.23) (4.9) (7.75) (2.64) (1.25) (1.4) (0.98)
Region 0.119***
(13.44)
Less18 -0.00962*** -0.00653*** -0.0126* -0.00896***
(-4.49) (-6.61) (-2.48) (-5.29)
Female 0.00465 0.00845*** 0.00777 0.00826***
(0.91) (7.55) (1.42) (4.91)
Rural -0.00138*** 0.000565*** -0.00103* 0.000536**
(-5.94) (5.54) (-2.84) (3.65)
Hispanic 0.00207* 0.000703** 0.00268 0.00141***
(2.41) (3.06) (1.67) (6.43)
Black 0.00695*** 0.00647*** 0.00595** 0.00603***
(11.12) (33.92) (4.07) (11.27)
Year -0.0189* -0.00381 -0.0286* -0.00479
(-2.27) (-0.79) (-2.42) (-0.90)
N 3788 3788 698 3090 698 3090 698 3090
R2 0.527 0.549 0.316 0.486 0.589 0.65 0.499 0.504
Ad j−R2 0.526 0.547 0.308 0.485 0.581 0.648 0.489 0.501
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; T-statistics in parentheses
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APPENDIX F: Standardized Beta coefficients
Variables
YPLL75 PUD MUD LBW
NE S NE S NE S NE S
Obese 0.386 0.336 0.232 0.262 0.219 0.201 0.208 0.123
Teenbirth 0.162 0.154
Uninsured -0.147 -0.114 -0.092 -0.14 -0.169 -0.081 -0.082 -0.102
PCP 0.016 0.018 -0.116 -0.108 -0.156 -0.106 -0.104 0.032
MHP -0.098 -0.084 -0.065 0.003
ACSC 0.173 0.18 0.222 0.104
HBA1C -0.07 -0.107
AFGR -0.074 -0.094 -0.123 -0.069 -0.088 -0.103 0.007 -0.055
Unemployed 0.133 0.026 0.002 0.148 0.009 0.107 0.069 0.001
Singleparent 0.247 0.195 0.366 0.074 0.392 0.062 0.056 0.094
Ozone-days 0.044 -0.086 0.056 -0.066 0.123 -0.019
Pm-days 0.043 0.014
less18 -0.135 -0.1
Over65 0.306 0.133 0.113 0.071 0.17 0.061
Female 0.093 -0.001 0.106 -0.014 -0.048 0.028 0.038 0.105
Rural 0.212 0.028 0.048 0.055 -0.024 -0.069 -0.27 0.08
Hispanic 0 -0.071 0.149 -0.022 0.016 -0.11 0.088 0.055
Black 0.354 0.057 -0.226 -0.297 -0.086 -0.301 0.443 0.586
Year -0.376 -0.166 -0.268 -0.127 -0.312 -0.085 -0.106 -0.015
N 706 3085 696 2847 696 2864 698 3090
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
T-statistics in parentheses
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APPENDIX G: Neumark Two-Fold Decompositions
YPLL75 MUD PUD LBW
Northeast 8.774*** 1.230*** 1.223*** 1.989***
(1193.88) (192.71) (176.70) (366.62)
South 9.169*** 1.408*** 1.287*** 2.219***
(2300.88) (329.17) (268.73) (611.04)
Difference -0.395*** -0.178*** -0.0636*** -0.230***
(-47.21) (-23.11) (-7.55) (-35.21)
Explained Portion -0.152*** -0.0411*** -0.00719 -0.142***
(-15.69) (-3.61) (-0.54) (-18.47)
Unexplained Portion -0.243*** -0.136*** -0.0564*** -0.0882***
(-24.92) (-11.10) (-3.88) (-11.94)
N 3791 3543 3560 3788
Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001; t-Statistics in parentheses




We adopt the formulation of the Gale-Nikaido (1965) theorem in Friedman (1990, p. 86)9
Theorem 1 Gale-Nikaido [1965] Univalence Theorem : Let f (x) be a function from a convex
set X ⊂ Rm to Rm. If the Jacobian of f is negative quasi-definite for all x ∈ X, then f is one to
one.
To establish existence we need derive conditions under which the Jacobian in Equation (8)
in the text is negative quasi-definite. For convenience we reproduce Equation (8) here:
J =

α1 +β1 β1 · · · β1





βn βn · · · αn +βn
 (A.2)
where
αi = Eθ [U iee−θd′U ieq] (A.3)
βi = Eθ [−θd′U ieq−θd′′U iq +(θd′)2U iqq] (A.4)
9. For other versions of the theorem see Parthasarathy (1983) and Sydsæter, Strøm, & Berck (2005,
pages 41 and 42).
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A matrix is negative quasidefinite if the sum of the matrix and its transpose is negative defi-
nite [Friedman (1990, p. 85)]. Now construct
J+ Jt =

2(α1 +β1) β1 +β2 · · · β1 +βn





β1 +βn β2 +βn · · · 2(αn +βn)
 (A.5)




2(α +β ) 2β · · · 2β





2β 2β · · · 2(α +β )
 (A.6)
We want this to be negative definite, which requires its principal minors to alternative in
alternate in sign, negative, positive, negative, etc. Notice that the principal minor of order
j = 1,2, . . . ,n is




+1 1 · · · 1
1 α
β










Now apply Result 20.11 of Sydsæter, Strøm, and Berck (2005, p. 143) to find
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Negative definiteness therefore requires α j−1(α + jβ ) to alternate in sign, negative, posi-
tive, negative, for j = 1,2, . . . ,n; which yields Proposition 1.
The principal minors will only alternate in sign if and only if α < 0. They will alternate in
sign in the proper sequence (negative, positive, negative, . . . ) if and only α + jβ .
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APPENDIX I: National Health Expenditures
Source: Martin et al., 2012
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APPENDIX J: Annual Change in Selected National Health Expenditures (96-08)
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2010
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APPENDIX K: Convergence clubs in prescription drugs expenditures
Clubs States
High AL, CT, DE, FL, KY, ME, MA, NJ, NY, NC, PA, RI, SC, TN, WV
Average Remaining states
Average-Low CO, NM
Low AZ, CA, HI, ID, MT, OR, SD, TX, UT, WA, WY
Source: Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2012)
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APPENDIX L: Region Specific Box-Cox Procedure Estimation of Lambda
λ Std. Err. P>z 95% Conf. Interval
Pooled Model 0.21689 0.03936 0 [0.13975, 0.29403]
High Spenders 0.56794 0.05008 0 [0.46978, 0.66610]
Average Spenders 0.69565 0.05326 0 [0.59127, 0.80003]
Low Spenders 0.08681 0.05643 0.124 [-0.0238, 0.19740]
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APPENDIX M: Box-Cox Analysis of Prescription Drug Consumption
(a) Pooled (b) High
(c) Average (d) Low
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APPENDIX N: Log-Likelihood Profile for Different Lambda
(a) Pooled (b) High
(c) Average (d) Low
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APPENDIX O: Scatter Plot of the Box-Cox Transformed to the Original variables
(a) Pooled (b) High
(c) Average (d) Low
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APPENDIX P: Scatter Plot of the Box-Cox Transformed to the Predicted values
(a) Pooled (b) High
(c) Average (d) Low
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APPENDIX Q: Marginal Effects Computation
Suppose Xi is the explanatory variable of interest, βi the estimated coefficient parameter,
and Y (λ ) the transform dependent variable.
The marginal effect of Xi is given by:
∂Y
∂Xi
= βi[λY (λ )+1]
1−λ
λ = βiỸ (A.9)
The following table summarizes the marginal effects for the significant variables the High
and Low Spending States
Margibal Effects of of Selected Significant Variables on Prescription Drugs Consumed
High Spenders Average Spenders
λ 0.567942 0.69565











APPENDIX Q: Income Elasticity Computation
The income elasticities for prescription drugs consumption is computed as follows for the high
and average spending regions:
• First, using the mean observation values for each region, we compute the Box-Cox pre-
dicted prescription drugs consumption level, Ȳ








with Inc the median household income level
The predicted prescription drugs consumption can be rewritten as:
Y (λ ) = β Inc+θ Inc2 +Z (A.11)
And




For the low spending region, the income elasticity is given by :
eY/Inc = [β +2θ ¯Inc] ¯Inc (A.13)
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Computed Income Elasticity by region
Pooled Model High Spenders Average Spenders Low Spenders
λ 0.216887 0.567942 0.69565 0
Ỹ 4376.414 158.468 26.639
Ȳ 89241.4117 121,708.79 52,263.14 99,996.41
β 0.000682 0.0359 -0.094 0.0000112
θ -5.56E-09 -3.31E-07 8.770E-07 -8.71E-11
¯Inc 40,414.33 37,784.04 39,349.57 43,006.06
Elasticity 0.461 0.535 -0.501 0.482
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APPENDIX R: Standardize- Beta Coefficients
Pooled Model High Spenders Average Spenders Low Spenders
Pooled Data High Spenders Average Spenders Low Spenders
Obese -0.010 -0.022 0.018 0.028
Smokers 0.090∗ -0.011 0.019 0.263∗∗
Fair-Poor 0.005 0.006 -0.097∗∗ -0.262∗
PCP 0.090∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.015 0.160∗∗
Uninsured 0.094 0.052 -0.077 0.040
Pharmacies 0.493∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.212
PSED 0.004 0.038 0.103∗ -0.036
Income 0.360 0.270∗ -0.256 0.057
GINI -0.005 -0.015 0.052 -0.092
Black -0.084∗∗ -0.041 -0.126∗∗ 0.112
Hispanic -0.047 -0.035 -0.038 0.054
P65 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.160∗ -0.114
Female 0.073∗ 0.006 0.017 0.062








Note: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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